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RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
In the Supreme Court of the United States.
ROBERT TAYLOR'S ADMINISTRATORS VS. NATHAN T. CARRYL.
1. Whilst a vessel is in the actual and legal possession of the Sheriff by virtue of a
writ of foreign attachment from a common law court of a State, the United States
Marshal cannot lawfully execute an attachment against her issued out of the
District Court of the United States in Admiralty in a proceeding in rem.
2. The United States Admiralty Court has no jurisdiction over a vessel whilst she
is in the hands of the Sheriff by virtue of legal process, and an order for the sale
of such a vessel made by the Admiralty is void: and a Marshal's sale by virtue
of such an order, though the sale be made after the Sheriff's possession had
ceased, is inoperative and gives no title to the purchaser.
TANEY, C. J., WAYNE, GRIER and CLIFFORD, dissenting.
This was a writ or error from the Supreme Court of the United
States to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The latter court
had affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court at Nisi Prius,
entered on a verdict in favor of Ward & Co., plaintiffs, in the :Nisi
Prius Court, in an action of replevin instituted by them against
Robert Taylor.
The action of replevin was commenced in the Nisi Prius Court
on the 24th February, 1848, for a barque called the Royal Saxon.
Ward & Co. had purchased the barque on the 9th February, 1848,
at a public sale of her by the sheriff of the county of Philadelphia,
made by order of the State court. Robert Taylor, afterwards, on
the 15th February, 1848, had purchased the vessel at a public sale
of her made by the United States Marshal for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, by virtue of a writ of sale issued by the District
Court of the United States for that district, sitting in admiralty.
The question for determination under the suit in replevin was, which
title to the vessel should prevail-that given by the sheriff to Ward
& Co., or that given by the marshal to Robert Taylor. The orders
of sale, both in the State court and in the admiralty, were made
on the ground that the vessel was chargeable and perishable.
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The records of the several suits in both courts showed, that on
the 4th November, 1847, the vessel had been seized by the sheriff
by virtue of a writ of foreign attachment, issuing out of the State
court against the owner, at the suit of certain of his creditors,
holders of bills of exchange: that soon after this the marshal took
possession of the vessel by virtue of process issued from the District
Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
on a claim of forfeiture made by the United States, which claim
having been afterwards (December 6, 1847,) dismissed, the sheriff
resumed possession. On the 15th January, 1848, the foreign
attachment creditors obtained a rule on the garnishee (Ingleby,
master" of the barque,) to show cause why the vessel should not be
sold as chargeable and perishable, and a similar rule was obtained
on the application of another foreign attachment creditor, and both
rules were made absolute on the 29th January, 1848, by the State
court. Before this,*however, viz: on the 21st January, 1848, the
seamen, who still remained on board the vessel, filed their libel in
the District Court of the United States in admiralty, for wages,
and on the same day process of attachment issued and was served
by the marshal, who returned, "attached the barque Royal Saxon
and found a sheriff's officer on board, claiming to have her in cus-
tody." On the 25th January, 1848, Captain Ingleby petitioned
the admiralty court for an order to sell the barque as chargeable,
&c., which petition was referred to a commissioner, who reported
in favor of the prayer of the petition, and an order for the sale of
the barque was thereupon made on the 4th February, 1848. The
order of sale to the sheriff issued from the State court on the 81st
January, 1848, and the writ of sale from the admiralty court
issued four days after, viz: the 4th February, 1848. The sheriff
sold the vessel at the Exchange on the 9th February, 1848, when
Ward & Co. became the purchasers: and the marshal held his sale
on board the vessel on the 15th of the same month, when Robert
Taylor became the purchaser. The proceeds of the sheriff's sale
were applied in part payment of the debt due to the foreign attach-
ment creditors; and the proceeds of the marshal's sale were paid
into the registry of the admiralty court, and the wages of the sea-
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men paid in full out of these. The seamen did not intervene nor
sue in the State court, nor make any claim for payment of their
wages in that court, either from the proceeds of the sheriff's sale
or otherwise, nor did the sheriff intervene in the admiralty, but the
foreign attachment creditors intervened there, and opposed the
granting of an order of sale by the admiralty court. Ward & Co.,
the purchasers at the sheriff's sale, did not intervene in the admi-
ralty, nor apply to that court to rescind its order of sale on con-
dition of paying the maritime liens to which the vessel might be
found subject; nor did the foreign attachment creditors, or the
purchaser at the sheriff's sale, appeal from the admiralty decree
ordering the sale of the vessel.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the sale of the
vessel by the sheriff divested the liens of the seamen, and that
therefore Ward & Co., the purchasers from the sheriff, took a good
title to her, unincumbered by these and all other maritime liens:
that the jurisdiction of the State court over the seamen's lien was
concurrent with that of the admiralty: and having once attached
over the vessel, the admiralty was ousted thereby of cognizance of
the seamen's case; that the proceedings in the foreign attachment
suits, under which the vessel was sold by the sheriff, were as fully
in rem as those in the admiralty, and the sale under them in the
State court divested all maritime liens, and that the only remedy
for the seamen was to have come into the State court and get their
wages out of the proceeds of the sheriff's sale; but that they were
not entitled to have recourse to the admiralty to enforce their liens
against the vessel in the hands of the sheriff, after the jurisdiction
of the State court over the vessel had once attached. (Taylor vs.
Car yl, 12 Harris, Pa. State Rep., 259-270; LOWRIE, J. deliver-
ing the opinion of the court. Charge of Judge Woodward to the
jury in Carryll vs. Taylor, 2 American Law Reg., 833-348.)
The case was argued three times before the Supreme Court of
the United States. The first argument was on the 5th and 6th of
February, 1857, C. J. Taney, and Justices McLean, Wayne, Nel-
son, Grier, Curtis, and Campbell being on the bench.
On the 19th February, 1857, an order was made continuing the
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cause to the next term, and then to be re-argued on two special
points designated by the court. The case was argued on these
points on the 11th and 14th December, 1857, before the same
judges, except Mr. Justice Curtis, who had resigned since the pre-
vious argument. Justices Catron and Daniel, who were absent
during the first argument, were present on the bench during the
second argument.
On the 26th February, 1858, by order of the court, the case was
again set down for re-argument on the 12th day of April, 1858, on
which day, and the two days next following, the whole case was
argued before a full bench, including Mr. Justice Clifford, who had
taken his seat since the second argument.
It was contended by Cadwalader and Hood, on behalf of the
plaintiffs in error, that the decision of the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania, and the grounds on which it rests, are contrary to the
constitution and laws of the United States, which prescribe the
jurisdiction and powers of the courts of the United States in Admi-
ralty and maritime causes.
1. That under the constitution and laws of the United States, the
District Court of the United States has jurisdiction over, and power
to enforce a claim for mariners' wages, by a proceeding in rem
against the vessel in the admiralty, notwithstanding the pendency
of a writ of foreign attachment in a common law court, and the
seizure of the vessel under it by the sheriff.
2. That a maritime lien for seamen's wages is not divested by a
sale of the vessel under a writ or order of a common law court,
made in a suit of foreign attachment brought by a creditor against
the owner; especially where such sale is made whilst proceedings
in rem against the'vessel, for the recovery of the seamen's wages,
was pending in the admiralty; and the purchaser at the sheriff's
sale, takes the vessel encumbered with the lien for seamen's wages.
Under the first point, it was contended that by the 9th section of
the judiciary act, 26th Sept., 1789, the D. C. of the U. S. in
admiralty, had exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the maritime lien
of the seamen against the vessel in specie; and that the State
court (a. common law court,) had no jurisdiction whatever over
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these maritime liens, nor any process competent to enforce them
against the vessel in specie; that the jurisdiction of the common
law court only extended to give the seamen a personal action for
their wages against the owner or master of the vessel, if the seamen
had chosen to proceed there, but that this jurisdiction would not
attach unless the seamen had instituted actions in the common law
court, which in this instance was not done; that the jurisdiction of
the common law court, by personal action, was not a concurrent
jurisdiction with the admiralty over the maritime lien, (of which
the admiralty had exclusive jurisdiction,) but a distinct common law
remedy allowed to seamen in addition to their remedy in the admi-
ralty on their lien; that this was the construction put on the
saving clause in the 9th section of the judiciary act by the Supreme
Court of the United States, in Waring vs. Clark, 5 Howard's Rep.
460-1, and in the cases of The Golden Gate and The Ambassador,
in the Circuit Court of the United States, for the District of Mis-
souri, 5 Am. Law Reg. 273, 290, &c. ; ibid. 153, 154.
As to the second point, it was contended that the maritime lien
of the seamen on the vessel was prior, in point of time, to the lien
of the sheriff by virtue of his seizure under the writ of foreign
attachment; that the seamen's was a privileged lien, enforceable
in the admiralty only, and incapable of being divested, by any
process but proceedings in rem in that court, which has exclusive
jurisdiction of maritime liens. Hfarmer vs. Bell, (The Bold Buc-
cleugh,) 22 Eng. L. and Eq. 62; Abbott, p. 780-1, (Boston ed.,
1846;) Curtis on Merchant Seamen, 318; 1 Conkl. Adm. Pr. 73,
76, (1st ed.); 3 Kent, 196-7, (5th ed.); Trandewater vs. Wills, 19
Howard, 89; 2 Browne's Civil and Adm. Law, 898; Watson on
Sheriffs, 181-2; The Rloyal Saxon, 2 Am. Law Reg. 328-9.
That immediately on the service of the admiralty attachment by
the marshal, the legal custody of the vessel, so far as was neces-
sary to protect and enforce the seamen's lien, was in the admiralty:
and that the efficacy of the proceeding in rem related back, for
these purposes, to the time when the liens were created prior to the
sheriff's seizure, (Jarvis, C. J., in Hfarmer vs. Bell, 22 Eng. L. &
Eq., 72); that the seizure by the sheriff could not affect maritime
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liens, over which the common law court had no jurisdiction, nor
the right of the seamen, who were no parties to the proceedings
in that court; and that even under a fI. fa. the sheriff could not
sell more than the interest of the owner in the vessel. Watson on
Sheriffs, 181-2 ; The Royal Saxon, 2 Am. Law Reg. 328-9;
Kane, J. Freeman vs. Caldwell, 10 Watts, 10, cited as authority,
5 Barr, 519; Hopkins vs. Forsythe, 2 Harris, 34; 1 ibid. 476;
Reid's Appeal.
That this legal custody of the admiralty is not incompatible with
the possession of the sheriff, nor need it interfere with his posses-
sion, nor with the proceedings in the common law court; the sheriff
might hold the vessel, notwithstanding the admiralty attachment,
until bail was entered in the State court, or until the owner's inte.
rest was sold to satisfy plaintiff's claim; but the proceeding in the
admiralty being known to the purchaser at the sheriffs sale, he
would take the vessel cum onere, and on paying off the maritime
liens, would acquire a good title. That this was the actual course
of proceeding in the case of the Royal Saxon; for the exercise of
the admiralty jurisdiction, at the instance of the seamen of the
Royal Saxon, neither interfered with the proceedings of the State
court, nor claimed to interfere with its la-tful jurisdiction ; and that
the marshal's sale was not in fact made until after the State court
and the sheriff had ceased to have or to claim any custody of or
control over the vessel.
. The following authorities were cited :-ITe Flora, 1 Hazzard,
298 ; The Spartan, Ware's Rep. 147 ; Certain Logs of Mahogany,
2 Sumner's Rep.; Ashbrook vs. The Golden Gate, 5 Aim. Law
Reg. 148-160; Sea Bird vs. Francis Beehler, 12 Missouri Rep.
569; Devinney vs. The Steamboat Memphis, Louisville Chan.
Court, May, 1854, 2 Am. Law Reg. 666, Philada.; O'Callaghan
vs. Riggs, 5 ibid. 139, McLean, J.
The general principles contended for on behalf of the plaintiffs
in error as to the respective jurisdictions of the common law and
admiralty courts, and the nature and efficacy of the process and
proceedings in each, in reference to the points in controversy, were
stated as follows:
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1. That over all maritime liens for seamen's wages, the District
Court of the United States has exclusive cognizance whenever
invoked by the seamen, and the State courts have no jurisdiction
over such liens.
2. Although a State court has no jurisdiction whatever over a
maritime lien, yet that court will afford to a seaman, if he choose
to resort to it, a remedy by personal action, against the owner or
master of the vessel, on the contract for wages, or perhaps by
permitting him to intervene in a personal action, already pending;
but the cognizance of the State court does not attach, unless specially
invoked by the seaman.
3. That the existence of one or more remedies for a seaman to
recover his wages in a State court, does not oust the cognizance of
the admiralty court over his lien against the vessel; the seaman
may persue either of these remedies only, or both together.
4. That the pendency of proceedings in foreign attachment, in a
State court, against the vessel, at the suit of a general creditor of
the owner, and the seizure and sale of the vessel, by the sheriff,
under such proceedings, do not oust the admiralty jurisdiction of
the District Court of the United States over liens for the wages of
the seaman, if invoked by them, nor prevent the admiralty court
from enforcing such liens against the vessel in specie, by proceedings
in rem.
5. That the sale of a vessel, under a writ or order of a common
law court, does not, under the general maritime law of the United
States, divest the lien of a seaman for his wages, so as to prevent
its enforcement against the vessel in specie, by the District Court
of the United States, under proceedings in rem in the admiralty.
6. That a sale of a vessel under a writ or order of the District
Court of the United States, proceeding in rem against a vessel in
the admiralty, not appealed from nor reversed, passes to the pur-
chaser a title to the vessel discharged of all liens and incumbrances
whatever.
7. That where a vessel, subject to maritime liens for seamen's
wages, is seized by the sheriff under a -writ from a State court, and
subsequently a proceeding in rem is commenced in the admirolty
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to enforce these liens, it would be an usurpation of admiralty juris-
diction by the State court, if, after being informed of the existence
of said liens and proceedings, the State court ordered a sale of the
vessel as perishable and chargeable on the ground, inter alia, of
the accruing daily expenses of the said mariner's wages.
8. The legal 6ustody of the vessel claimed for the admiralty in
this case, will not necessarily lead to conflict between the United
States and State courts and their respective officers; but, on the
contrary, will tend to prevent such conflicts by maintaining each
in the legitimate exercise of its jurisdiction and powers.
The jpoints specially submitted by the Supreme Court were argued
on the'second argument, viz:
1. Whether or not the District Court, sitting in admiralty, had
jurisdiction to make the order of sale of the "Royal Saxon," with-
out having first acquired any other custody or control of the vessel
by a seizure under the process of attachment issued to the marshal
on the filing of the libel for the seamen's wages, than appears by
the record in this case.
2. And if the District Court could not legally make the order at
the time it was passed, was the sale made by the marshal, under
the circumstances and in the manner stated in the record, and con-
firmed by the court, absolutely void, or only voidable and liable to
have been set aside for error upon appeal to a superior court.
As to these points, it was contended on the part of the plaintiffs
in error that the record showed that the marshal executed the writ
of attachment from the admiralty in the usual way, by exercising
in the most open and visible manner acts of custody and control
over the vessel, so as to indicate most unequivocally the custody of
the admiralty for the purpose of enforcing the maritime lien of the
seamen: he nailed a written notice of the attachment to the mast
on first attaching her, he put his lock on her, he was frequently on
board himself, and put her in charge of an officer, although that
was the less necessary, as the seamen themselves and the master
and mate were on board during the whole of the proceedings in
both courts; the marshal advertised a public sale of the vessel, to
be held on board, before and at the time when the sheriff's sale of
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her was going on at the Exchange: and in none of these acts was
he ever interrupted or interfered with by the sheriff or his watch-
man, or by the State court-nor did the sheriff or the foreign
attachment creditors complain of the marshal's acts to the admiralty,
nor apply to that court on the subject; the wharfage of the vessel
was paid by the marshal, and not by the sheriff, from January 21,
to February 18, 1848.
It was further contended that the return of the marshal to the
writ of attachment, viz : "January 21, 1848, attached the barque
Royal Saxon, and found a sheriff's officer on board claiming to have
her in custody," followed by the acts of custody and control referred
to, could not be construed into an abandonment of the vessel by the
admiralty to the sheriff, but simply amounted to a recognition of
the previous seizure of the vessel by the sheriff, and that this con-
struction of the marshal's return was in fact conceded by the foreign
attachment creditors themselves, when, after intervening and be-
coming parties to the proceedings before the commissioner of the
admiralty, they acquiesced in his report, which declared that the
vessel, by virtue of the admiralty process, was then remaining in
the legal custody of the marshal. Had they denied this finding of
the commissioner, it was competent for them (being parties) to have
excepted to his report, which was not done. If they had intended
to oppose the order of sale by the admiralty it was the duty of the
suitors in the State court to have filed exceptions to the report
recommending that order: they might thus have prevented the
order of sale on showing valid grounds to the judge of the District
Court of the United States, or after sale made and confirmed, and
final decree, they might have appealed to the Circuit Court of the
United States, and on good cause shown, procured the decree to
be reversed and the sale set aside. So the purchasers of the vessel
at the sheriff's sale, (Ward & Co.,) immediately after their purchase
on the 9th February, might have intervened in the admiralty pro-
ceedings, and applied to have the sale ordered by that court set
aside on the terms of paying the maritime liens, and if this were
refused, they might have appealed to the Circuit Court of the United
States. But none of these courses having been pursued, the pro-
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ceedings and final decree of the admiralty must be deemed regular
and valid and omnia presumuntur rite e8se acta.
.Evarts, for. defendant in error, contended, 1. That the cause
should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 2. That if the court
have jurisdiction of the cause, no error has intervened which can
be regarded by the court "as a ground of reversal" under the
special jurisdiction. 8. That on the whole merits of the case, the
judgment below should be affirmed by this court.
As to the third point-I. The plaintiff below, -by his purchase at
the sheriff's sale, acquired a good title to the barque "Royal Saxon."
1. 1By the process of foreign attachment, and the possession of
the sheriff under that process, the barque was in the custody. of the
law to abide the result of the suit in which process issued. Acts Penn.,
June 13, 1836, §§ 48-50, and March 20, 1845, 2; Morgan vs.
Whatmough, 5 Whart. 125; Serg. For. Att. 1, 23.
2. Its sale, pending the suit,. as perishable properly, was regular,
and by authority of a competent court having jurisdiction. .8. The
judicial sale of property as perishable is in the nature of the pro-
cedure, and from the same policy and necessity which occasion the
sale, a conversion or transmutation of the thing itself, overriding
every question of title and lien. Boster vs. Cockburn, Sir Thos.
Parker's Exch. R. 70; Jennings vs. Carson, 4 Cranch, 26, 27;
Grant vs. McLaughlin, 4 Johns. 84; The Tilton, 5 Mass. 481-2.
II. The defendant below, by his purchase at the marshal's sale
aqquired no title to the barque. 1. When the attachment and
monition issued in the admiralty suit, the barque was in the custody
of the sheriff of the county of Philadelphia, and so continued until
after the order for its sale as perishable. The marshal, therefore,
never had custody, nor the District Court possession of the barque,
to support any jurisdictioi to sell as perishable. The 1obert Fulton,
1 Paine, C. C. R. 625-6; JYagan vs. Lucas, 10 Peters, 403;
Jennings ys. Carson, 4 :Cranch, 26-7.
IIJ. . The sale by the sheriff gave to the purchaser a title dis-
chged pf ll lieps, which thereafter attached only to the fund
prod!icd by the. sale, .This. effect follows every judicial sale of the
res.itself,. (made -by, , copt hav!ng jurisdiqtion) and the qlaina.-of
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seamen's wages has no exemption from this consequence. 1. The
nature of the lien of seamen's wages subjects it to this consequence.
It is neither a jus in re nor a Jus ad rem; it gives no right of
possession, and is not displaced by change of possession: it is a
right of action to be enforced by judicial procedure and with (among
others) the special remedy of being satisfied, by means of such pro-
cedure, out of the ship. The Nancy, 1 Paine, C. C. R. 184; The
Brig Nhestor, 1 Sumn. 80 ; Ex parte Foster, 2 Story, 144; Hlarmer
vs. Bell, 22 Eng. L. & E. R. 72. Whatever prevents the judicial
process, (from whose vigor alone the seamen's right of action is
converted into a right of possession or dominion over the ship,) from
reaching the ship, postpones or defeats as the case may be, the
enforcement of his right of action against the ship. If the ship be
locally without the jurisdiction of the process, this postpones or
defeats the remedy. If the ship, though locally within the jurisdic-
tion of the process, be withdrawn from its operation by a previous
subjection to the process of anoLher jurisdiction, this postpones or
defeats the remedy. The 2Bobert .Fulton, and EHagan vs. ijucas,
ut supra.
A conversion of the ship into proceeds by a lawful exercise of
dominion over it, by permanent authority, or through judicial
sentence, defeats the remedy against the ship, which as it were,
no longer exists, in specie, to meet the remedy. Presb. Corp. vs.
Wallace, 3 Rawle, 150; Sheppard vs. Taylor, 5 Pet. 675; Brown
vs. Full, 2 Sumn. 441; Trump vs. Ship Thomas, Bee's R. 86;
The St. Jago de Cuba, 9 Wheat. 414, 419.
With regard to the question of custody discussed on the second
argument, the counsel on behalf of the defendant in error con-
tended, First. That the sheriff's custody continued after the action
of the admiralty ordering a sale, and terminated only by his execu-
tion of a writ of sale, as perishable, from the State Court, based
upon its custody through the sheriff and the delivery to the pur-
chaser of the subject of the sale. That no process in rem or in
per8onam, to bring either the res or parties into the jurisdiction of
the admiralty suit ever issued therein, except the first process to
which the marshal, so far as it was in rem, had returned that the
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res was in the custody of the sheriff, and that the whole action of
the admiralty court, upon which its sale is sought to be supported,
was complete while the sheriff's custody continued.
Second. At the time of the admiralty order of sale of the res as
perishable, it was not in the custody of the court. Valid process
for its seizure had been issued, but had not been executed, and
from and by the execution of process, whether in rem or in per-
sonata, the possession of the res, or power over the person, com-
mences. Adm. Rules, 8, 9; Benedict. Adm. Pr. §§ 434, 438-40.
The sheriff's custody was lawful and exclusive, and the marshal
followed the law and his duty in omitting to withdraw the res from
the custody in which he found it, and in certifying its predicament
to the admiralty court. By the process of foreign attachment
and the possession of the sheriff under that process, the barque was
in the custody of the law, to abide the result of the suit in which
process issued. Act Penn. June 13, 1836, §§ 48, 50; Ibid, March
20, 1845, § 2; Alorgan vs. What-mougA, 5 Whart. 125; Serg.
For. Att., 1, 23. No writ from the admiralty could wrest the res
from the potential custody of the sheriff, and a concurrent poten-
tial custody of the marshal and of the sheriff to subject the same
res to the exigency of conflicting mandates from independent juris-
dictions is an absurdity in terms. The Bobert Fulton, 1 Paine
C. 0. R. 625-6; Hagan vs. Lucas, 10 Pet. 403. The power and
duty of the marshal under a writ of attachment in the admiralty
are found in the writ itself, and do not at all depend upon the spe-
cial quality of the cause of action in the admiralty. Whether the
writ issue in a suit of freight, bottomry or seamen's wages, and
whether it be a writ of arrest or of foreign attachment, the exigency
of the writ is the measure of his authority, and if in any case, then
in every case, he can overwhelm the power of the State court and
of the sheriff, its officer. The record in the admiralty presents, on
its face, an exercise of jurisdiction to sell property as perishable
which was not, at the time of its decree in the premises, in itz cus-
tody, but was in the custody of an independent jurisdiction.
TMrd. The adjudication of sale by the admiralty court and the
sale thereunder were, then, wholly void, and this want of jurisdic-
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tion and invalidity of title made under the assumed jurisdiction was
examinable in the suit to try the title to the barque, wherever it
should arise. Borden vs. Fitch, 15 J. R. 141; Idlills vs. Martin,
19 J. R. 33 ; -Denning vs. Corwin, 11 Wend. 648; Elliot vs. Pier-
sol, 1 Pet. 328, 340; follingaworth vs. Barbour, 4 Pet. 466;
Williamson vs. Berry, 8 How. 495. The plaintiff below, the pur-
chaser at the sheriff's sale, was not a party to the admiralty suit
nor affected by any process in rem or in personam, which bound
him to the void adjudication, or put upon him any duty of contesta-
tion or appeal in the suit. At the time of the adjudication of sale
the only executed process in the suit was the monition upon which
Ingleby, the master, had been brought in, and upon which he had
intervened for himself and for his owner. The sale was ordered
upon his petition, and the libellants were the only other parties to
the suit. The process in rem, which by seizure of the res effects
notice and operates to estop all parties in interest, had not been
executed. Benedict. Adm. Pr. §§ 438-9. This process in rem,
although, after the sheriff had remitted the possession to the pur-
chaser, no legal impediment to its service existed, was not served,
and the sale was completed and confirmed in the same state of
parties and of process as that in which it was ordered.
Fourth. The title of a stranger buying at a judicial sale must
stand or fall on its validity. Here Taylor knew of the proceedings
in the State court and of the custody of the sheriff.
Fifth. The question here is, can the process of a federal court
-whose exigency requires the actual possession by its officer of the
res, take it from the custody of the State court, and frustrate the
whole process and jurisdiction of that court.
Sixth. The privileges of seamen and admiralty suitors do not ex-
tend so far as to lead to disturb the harmony between the Federal
and State courts.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-This cause comes before this court by writ of
error to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, under the 25th sec-
tion of the judiciary act of the 24th September, 1789.
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The defendants (Ward & Co.) instituted an action of replevin in
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, for the barque Royal Saxon.
Upon the trial of the cause at nisi prius, it appeared that the
barque arrived at the port of Philadelphia in October, 1847, on a
trading voyage, and was the property of Robert McIntyre, of Lon-
donderry, in Ireland. In November, 1847, she was seized by the
sheriff of Philadelphia county, under a writ of foreign attachment
that was issued against her owner and another, at the suit of
McGee & Co., of New Orleans, from the Supreme Court; and at
the same time her captain was summoned as a garnishee. On the
15th January, 1848, those creditors commenced proceedings in the
Supreme Court to obtain an order of sale, because the barque was
of a chargeable and perishable nature, suffering deterioration from
exposure to the weather, and incurring expenses of wharfage, cus-
tody fees, &c., &c. This application was opposed by the captain
of the barque, but was allowed by the court on the 29th of Janu-
ary, 1848. The vessel was duly sold by the sheriff under this
order, the 9th February, 1848, to the plaintiffs in the replevin,
Ward & Co.
On the 21st January, 1848, while the writs of attachment were
operative, and a motion for the sale of the barque was pending in
the Supreme Court, the seamen on board the barque filed their
libel in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, sitting in admiralty, for the balances of
wages due to them, respectively, up to that date, and prayed for
the process, of attachment against the barque, according; to the
practice of the court.. This was issued, and, on the same day,
the marshal returned on the writ, "Attached the barque Royal
Saxon, and found a sheriff's officer on board claiming to have her
in custody." The captain appeared to this libel and filed an-an-
swer, admitting the demands of the seamen.
On the 25th January he exhibited a petition to the District
Court, in which he represented the pendency of the suits in attach-
ment and in admiralty; that the barque was liable to him for
advances; that she was subject to heavy charges, and could not
be employed to carry freight; and therefore he, with the appro-
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bation of the British consul, which accompanied the petition, soli-
cited an order of sale for the benefit of all persons interested.
This order was granted by the District Court, after due inquiry,
on the 9th February, 1848, and was executed the 15th of Feb-
ruary, 1848, by the marshal of the court, at which time the defend-
ant in the replevin was the purchaser, who took the possession of
the vessel, and held her until re-taken in this replevin suit of Ward
& Co. Upon the trial of the replevin cause at nisi prius, the
defendant solicited instructions to the jury, which were refused by
the court, and the court instructed the jury unfavorably to his
title. From the instructions asked, and the charge delivered, a
selection is made to exhibit the questions decided. The court was
requested to charge-3. "That when the lien of a mariner for
wages is sought to be enforced in the admiralty by libel, and the
marshal has attached the vessel under such proceedings, the vessel
so attached is in the exclusive custody of the admiralty until the
claims of the libellants have been adjudicated, or the vessel relieved
by order of the court on stipulation, or otherwise ; and such exclu-
sive custody exists, notwithstanding a previous foreign attachment
from a court of law served on the vessel by the sheriff."
5. "That a foreign attachment is not properly a proceeding in
rem; but an attachment from the admiralty on a libel for mari-
ners' wages is in rem ; and the legal possession acquired by the
sheriff on service of the writ of foreign attachment is ended, super-
seded or suspended by the service of such attachment from the
admiralty."
8. "That when, on the 21st of January, 1848, the Royal Saxon
was attached under the process issued on the libel for mariners'
wages, she came, by virtue of that attachment into the exclu-
sive" custody of the court of admiralty; and such exclusive legal
custody continued from the 21st February, 1848, until the sale
by the marshal, by order of that court, on the 15th February,
1848."
10. "That the legal possession of the vessel being exclusively
in the admiralty court from the 21st January, 1848, till the sale
made, by order of that court, on the 15th February, 1848, the sale
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by the sheriff on the 9th February, 1848, gave no title to the pur-
chaser as against the sale by the marshal."
The court refused so to instruct the jury, but charged them
"That the court of admiralty could not proceed against the vessel
while she remained in the custody of an independent and com-
petent jurisdiction: that the presence of the marshal on the ship
did not prove his custody, for the sheriff's officer was there before
him; that the marshal did not dispossess the sheriff, but prudently
retired himself, and informed the court in his return that the vessel
was in the custody of the sheriff; that if the sheriff first took pos-
session of the vessel, and maintained it until she was sold to the
plaintiffs, they had the better title; and that the fact of the con-
tinuing possession of the sheriff was for the jury." A verdict was
returned in favor of the plaintiffs, on which a judgment was ren-
dered in the Supreme Court in their favor, confirming the opinion
of the judge as expressed to the jury at nisi prius.
The judgment of the District Court allowing the order of sale
proceeded upon the grounds: "That the suits in attachment in the
Supreme Court applied to alleged interests in the vessel, not to the
vessel itself. The attachment creditor, if he succeeds in his suit,
obtains recourse against the thing attached just so far as his
defendant had interest in it, and no farther. The rights of third
parties remain in both cases unaffected. The bottomry creditor
residing, it may be, in a foreign country, is no party to either pro-
ceeding, and loses none of his rights. His contract was with the
thing, not the owner, and it is therefore not embarrassed, and
cannot be, by any question or contest of ownership. So, too,
seamen, whoever owns the vessel, or how often soever the owner-
ship may be changed, wherever she may go, whatever may befall
her, so long as a plank remains of her hull, the seamen are
her first creditors, and she is privileged to them for their wages,"
&c., &c.
Again: "What interest in the ship," asks the District Court,
"does the sheriff propose to sell ? Not a title to it, but the defen-
dant's property in it, whatever it may be. Not so in the admiralty.
Here the subject-matter of the controversy is the res itself. It
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passes into the custody of the court. All the world are parties,
and the decree concludes all outstanding interests, because all are
represented. Here they are marshalled in their order of title and
privilege. There is no difficulty in allowing an arrest by the
admiralty, notwithstanding the vessel, or some interest in it, has
passed into the custody of the sheriff. He retains all his rights
notwithstanding the marshal's intervention. The proceedings
against the vessel, the thing, the subject of the property or title,
may still go on in the admiralty. The sheriff's vendee of the
ship may intervene there, as the defendant might have done in
this court; he may make defence to the proceeding there as the
successor to the defendant's rights, and may be substituted ulti-
mately before the judge of the admiralty as a claimant of the
surplus fund."
This cause has been regarded in this court as one of importance.
It has been argued three different times at the bar, and has received
the careful consideration of the court. The deliberations of the
court have resulted in the conviction that the question presented in
the cause is not a new question, and is not determinable upon any
novel principle, but that the question has come before this and
other courts, in other forms, and has received its solution by the
application of a comprehensive principle which has recommended
itself to the courts as just and equal, and as opposing no hindrance
to an efficient administration of the judicial power.
In Payne vs. Drew, 4 East, 523, Lord Ellenborough said: "It
appears to me, therefore, not to be contradictory to any cases, nor
any principles of law, and to be mainly conducive to public conve-
nience, and to the prevention of fraud and vexatious delay in these
matters, to hold, that where there are several authorities equally
competent to bind the goods of a party, when executed by the pro-
per officer, that they shall be considered as effectually, and for all
purposes, bound by the authority which first actually attaches upon
them in point of execution, and under which an execution shall
have been first executed."
This rule is the fruit of experience and wisdom, and regulates
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the relations and maintains harmony among the various superior
courts of law and of chancery in Great Britain.
Those courts take efficient measures to maintain their control
over property within their custody, and support their officers in
defending it with firmness and constancy. The Court of Chancery
does not allow the possession of its receiver, sequestrator, commit-
tee, or custodee to be disturbed by a party, whether claiming by
title paramount, or under the. right which they were appointed to
protect, Evelyn vs. Lewis, 3 Hare, 472; 5 Madd. 406, as their
possession is the possession of the court. Noe vs. Gibson, 7 Paige,
713. Nor will the court allow an interfering claimant to question
the validity of the orders under which possession was obtained, on
the ground that they were improvidently made. Bussell vs. East
Anglien R. Co., 3 MeN. and Gord. 104. The courts of law up-
hold the right of their officers to maintain actions to recover pro-
perty withdrawn from them, and for disturbance to them in the
exercise of the duties of their office.
But it is in this court that the principle stated in Payne vs. Drew
has received its clearest illustration, and been employed most fre-
quently, and with most benignant results. It forms a recognised
portion of the duty of this court to give preference to such princi-
ples and methods of procedure as shall serve to conciliate the dis-
tinct and independent tribunals of the States, and of the Union, so
that -they may co-operate as harmonious members of a judicial
system co-extensive with the United States, and submitting to the
paramount authority of the same constitution, laws, and federal
obligations. The decisions of this court that disclose such" an aim,
and that embody the principles and modes of administration to ac-
complish it, have gone from .the court with authority, and have
returned to it bringing the vigor and strength that are always
imparted to magistrates of whatever class, by the approbation and
confidence of those submitted to their government. The decision
in the case of Hfagan vs. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400, is of this class. It
was a case in which a sheriff had seized property under valid pro-
cess from a State court, and had delivered it on bail to abide a
trial of the right to the property, and its liability to the execution.
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The same property was then seized by the marshal, under process,
against the same defendant. This court, in their opinion, say:
"Where a sheriff has made a levy, and afterwards receives execu-
tions against the same defendant, he may appropriate any surplus
that shall remain, after satisfying the first levy by the order of the
court. But the same rule does not govern when the executions, as
in the present case, issue from different jurisdictions. The marshal
may apply moneys collected under different executions, the same
as the sheriff. But this cannot be done as between the marshal
and the sheriff; a most injurious conflict of jurisdiction would be
likely often to arise between the federal and the State courts, if
the final process of the one could be levied on property which had
been taken on process of the other. The marshal or the sheriff, as
the case may be, by a levy acquires a special property in the goods,
and may maintain an action for them. But if the same goods may
be taker in execution by the marshal and the sheriff, does this spe-
cial property vest in the one or the other, or both of them? P No
SUCH CASE CAN EXIST ; property once levied on remains in the cus-
tody of the law, and is not liable to be taken by another execution
in the hands of a different officer, and especially by an officer acting
under another jurisdiction." The principle contained in this ex-
tract from the opinion of the court was applied by this court to
determine the conflicting pretensions of creditors by judgment in a
court of the United States, and an administrator who has declared
the insolvency of his estate, and was administering it under the
orders of a Probate Court; (8 How. S. 0. R., 107;) in a contro-
versy between receivers and trustees holding under a Court of
Chancery, and judgment creditors seeking their remedy by means
of executory process; (14 How. S. C. R. 52, 868;) and to settle
the priorities of execution creditors of distinct courts." -Pulliam
vs. Osborn, 17 How. 471.
In a case not dissimilar in principle from the present the princi-
ple was applied in favor of the Executive Department, having
property in custody, whose possession was disturbed by a State offi-
cer under judicial process. An attachment from a State court was
levied upon merchandise imported, but not entered at the custom-
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house, and the validity of the levy was the question involved.
Harmar vs. Dennie, 3 Pet. 292. The court say: "1From their ar-
rival in port the goods are, in legal contemplation, in the custody
of the United States. An attachment of such goods presupposes a
right to take the possession and custody, and to make such posses-
sion and custody exclusive. If the officer attaches upon mesne pro-
cess, he has the right to bold the possession to answer the exigency
of the writ. The act of Congress recognises no such authority, and
admits of no such exercise of right." To the argument that the
United States might hold for the purpose of collecting duties, and
the sheriff might attach the residuary right subject to the prior
claim, the court say: "The United States have nowhere recognised
or provided for a concurrent possession or custody by any such
officer."
A redognition of the same principle is to be found in reck vs.
Jenness, 7 How. S. C. R., 612. An act of Congress had conferred
on the courts of the United States exclusive jurisdiction "1 of all
suits and proceedings of bankruptcy," and had provided that the
act should not be held to impair or destroy existing rights, liens,
mortgages, &c., &c., on the estate of the bankrupt. A District
Court of the United States decided that its jurisdiction extended to
administer the entire estate of the Bankrupt Court, and that the
liens on the property, whether judicial or consensual, must be as-
serted exclusively in that court, and that all other jurisdictions had
been superseded. This court denied the pretension of the District
Court, and affirmed, "That when a court has jurisdiction it has a
right to decide every question which occurs in the cause; and when
the jurisdiction of the court, and the right of the plaintiff to prose-
cute his suit, has once attached, that right cannot be arrested or
taken away by proceedings in another suit. These rules have their
foundation not merely in comity, but in necessity; for if one may
enjoin, the other may retort, by injunction, and thus the parties
be without remedy, being liable to a process for contempt in one if
they dare to proceed in the other. Neither can one take property
from the custody of the other by replevin, or any other process, for
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this would produce a conflict extremely embarrassing to the admin-
istration of justice."
The legislation of congress, in organizing the judicial powers of
the United States, exhibits much circumspection in avoiding occa-
sions for placing the tribunals of the States and of the Union in
any collision. A limited number of cases exist, in which a party
sued in a State court may obtain the transfer of the cause to a
court of the United States, by an application to the State court in
which it was commenced; and this court, in a few well defined
cases, by the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789, may revise
the judgment of the tribunal of last resort of a State. In all other
respects the tribunals of the State and the Union are independent
of one another. The courts of the United States cannot issue "an
injunction to stay proceedings in any court of a State," and the
judiciary act provides that "1 writs of habeas corpus shall in no case
extend to prisoners in jail, unless where they are in custody under
or by color of authority of the United States, or are committed for
trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought
into court to testify." "1 Thus, as the law now stands," say this
court, "an individual who may be indicted in a circuit court for
treason against the United States, is beyond the power of the fede-
ral courts and judges, if he be in custody under the authority of a
State." Ex parte Door, 3 How. S. 0. R., 103. And signal in-
stances are reported in verification of the above statement. .Ex
parte Robinson, 6 McLean R. 355.
This inquiry will not be considered as irrelevant to the question
under the consideration of the court. The process of foreign
attachment has been for a long time in use in Pennsylvania, and its
operation is well defined, by statute as well as judicial precedent.
The duties of the sheriff, under that process, are identical with
those of a marshal, holding an attachment from the District Court
sitting in admiralty. "The goods and chattels of the defendant,
in the attachment, (such is the language of the statute,) in the
hands of the garnishee, shall, after such service, be bound by such
writ, and be in the officer's power ; and if susceptible of seizure
or manual occupation, the officers shall proceed to secure the
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same, to answer and abide the judgment of the court in that
case, unless the person having the same shall give security.
Purdon's Dig., 50, § 50; 5 Whart., 125; Oarryl vs. Taylor, 12
Harris, 264.
It follows, by an inevitable induction from the cases of -larmar
vs. Dennie, 3 Pet., 299; Blagan vs. Lucas, 10 Pet., 400, and
.Peck vs. Jenness, 7 How., 612, that the custody acquired through
the "seizure or manual occupation" of the Royal Saxon, under the
attachment by the sheriff of Philadelphia county, could not legally
be obstructed by the marshal, nor could he properly assert a con-
current right with him in the property, unless the court of admi-
ralty holds some peculiar relation to the State courts or to the
property attached, which authorized the action or right of its
marshal. The relation of the district courts, as courts of admiralty,
is defined with exactness and precision by Justice Story in his Com-
mentaries on the Constitution. He says: "1 M r. Chancellor Kent
and Mr. Rawle seem to think that the admiralty jurisdiction given
by the constitution is, in all cases, necessarily exclusive. But it is
believed that this opinion is founded on mistake. It is exclusive in
all matters of prize, for the reason that, at the common law, this
jurisdiction is vested in the courts of admiralty, to the exclusion of
the courts of common law. But in cases where the jurisdiction of
common law and admiralty are concurrent, (as in cases of posses-
sory suits, mariners' wages, and marine torts,) there is nothing in
the constitution necessarily leading to the conclusion that the juris-
diction was intended to be exclusive; and there is no better ground,
upon general reasoning, to contend for it. The reasonalilo inter-
pretation," continues the commentator, "would seem to be that it
conferred on the national judiciary the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction exactly according to the nature and extent and modifi-
cations in which it existed in the jurisprudence of the common law.
When the jurisdiction was exclusive, it remained so; when it was
concurrent, it remained so. Hence the States could have no right
to create courts of admiralty as such, or to confer on their own
courts the cognizance of such cases as were exclusively cognizable.
in admiralty courts. But the States might well retain and exercise
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the jurisdiction in cases of which the cognizance was previously
concurrent in the courts of common law. This latter class of
cases can be no more deemed cases of admiralty and maritime juris-
diction than cases of common law jurisdiction." 3 Story's Com.,
§ 1666, note.
In conformity with this opinion, the habit of courts of common
law has been to deal with- ships as personal property, subject in the
main, like other personal property, to municipal authority, and
liable to their remedial process of attachment and execution, and
the titles to them, or contracts and torts relating to them, are cog-
nizable in those courts.
It has not been made a question here that the Royal Saxon could
not be attached, or that the title could not be decided in replevin.
But the District Court seems to have considered that a ship was a
juridical person, having a status in the courts of admiralty, and
that the admiralty was entitled to precedence whenever any ques-
tion arose which authorized a judicial tribunal to call this legal
entity before it. The District Court, in describing the source of
its authority, says of the contract of bottomry, that "it is made
with the thing, and not the owner," and that the contract of the
mariner's is similar ; that the RES "represents" in that court all
persons having a right and privilege, while the rights of the owner
are treated there as something incorporeal, separable from the res,
and which might be seized by the sheriff, even though the res might
be in the admiralty. This representation is not true in matter of
fact, nor in point of law. Contracts with mariners for service, and
other contracts of that kind, are made on behalf of owners who
incur a personal responsibility; and if lenders on bottomry depend
upon the vessel for payment, it is because the liability of the owner
is waived in the contract itself. "In all causes of action," says the
judge of the admiralty of Great Britain, "which may arise during
the ownership of the persons whose ship is proceeded against, I
apprehend that no suit could ever be maintained against a ship
where the owners were not themselves personally liable, or where
the liability had not been given up." The Druid, 1 Win. Rob.
399. And the opinion of this court in T7he Schooner Freeman vs.
Buckingham, 18 How., 183, was to the same effect.
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In courts of common law, the forms of action limit a suit to the
persons whose legal right has been affected, and those who have
impaired or injured it. In chancery, the number of the parties is
enlarged, and all are included who are interested in the object of
the suit; and as the parties are generally known, they are made
parties by name and by special notice.
In admiralty, all parties who have an interest in the subject
of the suit-the res-may appear, and each may propound inde-
pendently his interest. The seizure of the RES, and the publica-
tion of the monition or invitation to appear, is regarded as equi-
valent to the particular service of process in the courts of law
and equity. But the RES is in no other sense than this the
representative of the whole world. But it follows, that to give
jurisdiction in rem., there must have been a valid seizure-and
an actual control of the ship by the marshal of the court; and
the authorities are to this effect. Jennings vs. Oarson, 4 Cr., 2;
2 Ware's Adm. R. 362. In the present instance, the service was
typical. There was no exclusive custody or control of the barque
by the marshal from the 21st of January, 1848, to the day of the
sale; and when the order of sale was made in the District Court,
she was in the actual and legal possession of the sheriff.
The case of the Oliver Tordan, 2 Curtis R. 414, was one of a vessel
attached by a sheriff in Maine, under process from the Supreme
Court. She was subsequently libelled in the District Court of the
United States upon the claim of a material man. The District
Court sustained the jurisdiction of the court. But on appeal the
exception to the jurisdiction was allowed, and the decree of the Dis-
trict Court reversed. Mr. Justice Curtis observed: "This vessel
being in the custody of the law of the State, the marshal could not
lawfully execute the warrant of arrest." In the case of the ship
Bobert Fulton, 1 Paine, C. 0. R., 620, the late Mr. Justice Thomp-
son held that the warrant from the admiralty could not be lawfully
executed under similar circumstances, and that the District Court
could not proceed in rem. The same subject has been considered
by State courts, and their authority is to the same effect. Keating
vs. Sink, 8 Ohio R. N. S., 105; Carryl vs. Taylor, 12 Harris, 264.
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Our conclusion is, that the District Court of Pennsylvania had
no jurisdiction over the Royal Saxon when its order of sale was
made, and that the sale by the marshal was inoperative.
The view we have taken of this cause renders it unnecessay for
us to consider any question relative to the respective liens of the
attaching creditors, and of the seamen for wages, or as to the
effect of the sale of the property as chargeable or as perishable,
upon them.
Our opinion is, that there is no error in so much of the record
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as is brought before this
court by the writ of error, and the judgment of the court is conse-
quently affirmed.
TaEY, J. (dissenting.)-I dissent from the opinion of the court.
The principle upon which the case is decided is so important, and
will operate so widely, that I feel it my duty to show the grounds
upon which I differ. This will be done as briefly as I can ; for my
object is to state the principles of law upon which my opinion is
formed, rather than to argue them at length.
The opinion of the court treats this controversy as a conflict be-
tween the jurisdiction and rights of a State court, and the jurisdic-
tion and rights of a court of the United States, as a conflict be-
tween sovereignties, both acting by their own officers within the
spheres of their acknowledged powers. In my judgment this is a
mistaken view of the question presented by the record. It is not a
question between the relative powers of a State and the United States
acting through their judicial tribunals, but merely upon the relative
powers and duties of a court of admiralty and a court of common
law in the case of an admitted maritime lien. It is true that the
court of admiralty is a court of the United States, and the court of
common law is a court of the State of Pennsylvania. But the very
same questions may arise, and, indeed, have arisen, where both
courts are created by and acting under the same sovereignty. And
the relative powers and duties of a court of admiralty and a court
of common law can upon no sound principles be different, because
the one is a court of the United States and the other the court of
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a State. The same rules which would govern under similar cir-
cumstances, where the process of attachment or a fieri facias had
issued from a circuit court of the United States exercising a com-
mon law jurisdiction, must govern in this case. The cour:
miralty and the court of common law have each their appropriate
and prescribed sphere of action, and can never come in conflict,
unless one of them goes outside of its proper orbit. And a court
of a common law, although acting under a State, has no right to
place itself within the sphere of action appropriated peculiarly and
exclusively to a court of admiralty, and thereby impede it in the
discharge of the duties imposed upon it by the Constitution and
the law.
There are some principles of law which have been so long and so
well established that it is sufficient to state them without referring
to authorities.
The lien of seamen for their wages is prior and paramount to all
other claims on the vessel, and must be first paid.
By the Constitution and laws of the United States the only
court that has jurisdiction over this lien, or authorized to enforce
it, is the court of admiralty, and it is the duty of that court to
do so.
The seamen, as a matter of right, are entitled to the process of
the court to enforce payment promptly, in order that they may not
be left penniless, and without the means of support on shore. And
the right to this remedy is as well and firmly established as the
right to the paramount lien.
No court of common law can enforce or displace this lien. It
has no jurisdiction over it, nor any right to obstruct or interfere
with the lien, or the remedy which is given to the seaman.
A general creditor of the ship-owner has no lien on the vessel.
When she is attached (as in this case) by process from a court of
common law, nothing is taken, or can he taken, but the interest of
the owner remaining after the maritime liens are satisfied. The
seizure does not reach them. The thing taken is not the whole in-
terest in the ship. And the only interest -which this process can
seize is a secondary and subordinate interest, subject to the supe-
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rior and paramount claims for seamen's wages; and what will be
the amount of those claims, or whether anything would remain to
be attached, the court of common law cannot know until they are
heard and decided upon in the court of admiralty.
I do not understand these propositions to be disputed.
-Under the attachment, therefore, which issued from the common
law court of Pennsylvania, nothing was legally in the custody of
the sheriff but the interest of the owner, whatever it might prove
to be, after the liens were heard and adjudicated in the only court
that could hear and determine them. The common law process
was not and could not be a proceeding in rem, to charge the ship
with the debt, for the creditor has no lien upon her, and the court
had no jurisdiction over anything but the owner's residuum.
The whole ship could not be sold by them, so as to convey an
absolute right of property to the purchaser. And even v.hat was
seized was not taken to subject it to the payment of the debt, but
merely to compel the owner to appear personally to a suit brought
against him in personam in the court which issued the process of
attachment. It was ancillary to the suit against him personally,
and nothing more. The vessel would be released from the process
and restored to him as soon as he gave bail, and appeared to the
suit; and she would be condemned and sold only upon his refusal
to appear. But according to the laws of the State, and the prac-
tice of the common law court, twelve months or more might elapse
before the vessel was either sold or released from the process.
The question, then, is simply this, can a court of common law,
having jurisdiction of only a subordinate and inferior interest, shut
the doors of justice for twelve months or more against the para-
mount and superior claims of seamen for wages due, and prevent
them from seeking a remedy in the only court that can give it ? I
think not. And if it can be done, then the paramount rights of
seamen for wages, so long and so constantly admitted, is a delusion.
The denial of the remedy for twelve months or more after the ship
has arrived, is equivalent, in its effect upon them, to a denial of the
lien; substantially and practically it would amount to the same
thing. And it is equally a denial of the right of the court of ad-
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miralty to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it by the constitu-
tion and laws of the United States.
Now it is very clear, that if this ship had been seized by process;
from a common law court of the United States for a debt due from
the owner, the possession of the marshal under that process would
have been superseded by process from the admiralty upon a pre-
ferred maritime lien. This I understand to be admitted. And
if it be admitted, I do not see how the fact that this process was
from a common law court of a State, and served by its own officer,
can make any difference; for the common law court of a State has
no more right to impede the admiralty in the exercise of its legiti-
mate and exclusive powers, than a common law court of the United
States. And the sheriff, who is the mere ministerial officer of the
court of common law, can have no greater power or jurisdiction
over the vessel than the court whose process he executes. He
seizes what the court had a right to seize; he has no right of
possession beyond it ; and if the interest over which the court has
jurisdiction is secondary and subordinate to the interest over which
the admiralty has exclusive jurisdiction, his possession is secondary
and subordinate in like manner, and subject to the process on the
superior and paramount claim. It is the process and the authority
of the court to issue it that must determine who has the superior
right. And if the one is to enforce a right paramount and superior
to the other, it is perfectly immaterial whether the first process was
served bya sheriff or the marshal. Nor does it make any difference
when they are served by different officers of different courts. In
the case of the Flora, 1 Hagg. 298, the vessel had been seized by a
sheriff upon process from the Court of King's Bench. She was
afterwards, and while in possession of the sheriff, arrested upon
process from the admiralty on a prior maritime lien, and was sol&
by the marshal while the sheriff still held her under the common
law process. The sale by the marshal was held to be valid by the
King's Bench. It is true, that the creditor at whose suit the vessel
was seized by the sheriff consented to the sale, and claimed to come
in for the surplus after paying the maritime lien. But if the mar-
shal could not lawfully arrest while she was in the possession of the:
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sheriff, he could not lawfully sell under that arrest, nor while the
sheriff still held possession, and no consent of parties would make
it a valid marshal's sale, and give a good title to the purchaser, if
the sale was without authority of law. The validity of these pro-
ceedings was brought before the courts by the ship-owner, and ear-
nestly litigated. The Court of King's Bench sanctioned the sale
not upon the ground that the creditor consented to it, but upon the
ground that the marshal acted under a court of competent authority
(see note 801), and they refused to interfere with the surplus
which remained after payment of seamen's wages, which had
been paid into the registry of the admiralty, even in behalf of the
creditor who had seized under their own process. The King's
Bench do not seem to have supposed there was any conflict of
jurisdiction in the case, or that their process or officer had been
improperly interfered with by the marshal, nor did the King's
Bench hold that there was any incongruity in the possession of the
sheriff and the marshal at the same time. On the contrary, it was
conceded on all hands that the possession of the sheriff was no
obstacle to the arrest by the marshal, nor any impediment in the
way of the admiralty when exercising its appropriate and exclusive
jurisdiction, in enforcing claims prior and superior to that of the
attaching creditor. Is there any substantial difference between
that case and the one before us? I can see none.
Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, states the principle with
his usual precision and clearness, and in a few words. In vol. 1st,
880, speaking of the lien for seamen's wages, he says: "The admi-
ralty jurisdiction is essential in all such cases, for the process of a
court of common law cannot directly touch the thing in specie."
And in my judgment the process of the court of common law in
this case did not touch the interest of the seamen in the ship.
But it seems, however, to be supposed, that the circumstance
that the common law court was the court of a State, and not of the
United States, distinguishes this case from that of the Flora, and is
decisive in this controversy. And it is said that the Royal Saxon,
being in possession of an officer of a State court, under process from
the court, she was in the possession of an officer of another sover-
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eignty and was in the custody of its law, and that no process could
be served upon her issuing from the court of a different sovereignty,
without infringing upon the rights of the State, and bringing on
unavoidably a conflict between the United States and the State.
If by another and different sovereignty, it is meant that the
power of the State is sovereign within its sphere of action, as marked
out by the constitution of the United States, and that no court
or officer of the United States can seize or interfere with property
in the custody of an officer of a State court, where the property and
all the rights in it are subject to the control of the judicial authori-
ties of the State, nobody will dispute the proposition. But if it is
intended to say that in the administration of judicial power, the
tribunals of the States and the United States are to be regarded
as the tribunals of separate and independent sovereignties, dealing
with each in this respect upon the principles which govern the
comity of nations, I cannot assent to it. The constitution of the
United States is as much a part of the law of Pennsylvania as
its own constitution, and the laws passed by the general govern-
ment pursuant to the constitution are as obligatory upon the courts
of the States as upon those of the United States; and they are
equally bound to respect and uphold the acts and process of the
courts of the United States, when acting within the scope of its
legitimate authority. And ifs courts of common law stand in the
same relation to the courts of admiralty in the exercise of their
judicial powers, as if they were courts of common law of the United
States. The constitution and the laws, which establish the admi-
ralty courts and regulate their jurisdiction, are a part of the
supreme law of the State; and the State could not authorize its com-
mon law courts to issue any process, or its officers to execute it,
which would impede or prevent the admiralty court from perform-
ing the duties imposed upon it, on exercising the power conferred
on it by the constitution and laws of the United States. The State
courts have not, and cannot have, any jurisdiction in admiralty and
maritime liens to bring them into conflict with the courts of the
United States. This principle appears to me to rest on the clear
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construction of the constitution, and has been maintained by emi-
nent jurists.
Precisely the same questions now decided came before the Circuit
Court of Massachusetts twenty years ago, in the case of Certain Log8
of Mahogany, Thomas Richardson claimant, reported in 2d Sumn.,
589 ; and also before the District Court of the State of Maine, thirty
years ago, in the case of Poland and others vs. The freight and
cargo of the brig ,Spartan, reported in Ware's Rep. 143, and in both
of these cases the point was fully considered and decided by the
court; and in both it was held that a previous seizure under a pro-
cess of attachment from a State court could not prevent the admi-
ralty from proceeding in rem to enforce the peferred liens of which
it has exclusive jurisdiction.
In the case in the Circuit Court of Massachusetts, Mr. Justice
Story says: "1 A suit in a State court by replevin or by attachment
can never be admitted to supersede the right of a court of admiralty
to proceed by a suit in rem, to enforce a right against that property,
to whomsoever it may belong. The admiralty does not attempt to
enter into any conflict with the State court, as to the just operation
of its own process; but it merely asserts a paramount right against
all persons whatever, whether claiming above or under the process.
No doubt can exist that a ship may be seized under admiralty pro-
cess for a forfeiture, notwithstanding a prior replevin or attachment
of the ship then pending. The same thing is true as to the lien on
a ship for seamen's wages, or a bottomry bond."
I quote the words of Mr. Justice Story, because he briefly and
clearly states the principle upon which the jurisdiction of the respec-
tive courts is regulated, and upon which I think this case ought to
be decided. The constitution and laws of the United States confer
the entire admiralty and maritime jurisdiction expressly upon the
courts of the general government. And admiralty and maritime liens
are therefore outside of the line which marks the authority of a
common law court of a State, and excluded from its jurisdiction.
And if a common law court sells the vessel to which the lien has
attached, upon condemnation, to pay the debt, or on account of its
perishable condition, it must sell subject to the maritime liens, and
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they will adhere to the vessel in the hands of the purchaser, and of
those claiming under him.
Upon what sound principle, then, of judicial reasoning can it be
maintained, that although the process of a common law court can-
not reach the maritime liens, yet, by laying hold of some other inter-
est, it can withdraw them from admiralty for an indefinite period of
time? It cannot issue its mandate to the admiralty, not to proceed
upon those liens; but, according to the present decision, it may
take the lien out of its power and out of its jurisdiction. I cannot
be persuaded that a court which, by the Constitution of the United
States, has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter-that is, the
maritime lien-can directly or indirectly prevent or delay the court
which, by the constitution, has exclusive jurisdiction, from fulfilling
its judicial duty or the seamen from pursuing their remedy, where
alone they can obtain it.
But the decision of this court in the case of Hfagan vs. Lucas, 10
Pet., 400, it is said, is the same in principle, and must govern the
case now before us. If this were the case I should yield to its
authority, however reluctant I might feel to do so. But in my judg-
ment the point decided in that case has no analogy whatever to the
questions arising in this.
In the case of Hfagam vs. Lucas, a judgment had been obtained in
the State Court of Alabama against certain defendants, and an
execution issued, upon which certain slaves were seized by the sheriff
as the property of the defendants. Lucas, the defendant in this
writ of error, claimed the property as belonging to him; and under,
a statute of Alabama, the property was restored to him by the
sheriff, upon his giving bond for the forthcoming of the slaves, if it
should be found that they were the property of the persons against
whom the execution was issued. And proceedings were thereupon
had to try before court the right of property, according to the pro-
visions of the State law. Pending these proceedings, a judgment
was obtained in the district court of the United States against the
same defendants, and an execution issued, which the marshal levied
on thesame property that had been seized by the sheriff. Lucas
thereupon appeared in court, and again claimed the slaves as belong-
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ing to him, and at the trial exhibited proof that the proceedings to
try the right of property under the sheriff's levy were still pending
and undetermined in the State court. Both the court below and
this court held, that under these circumstances the property could
not be taken in execution by the marshal upon process from the dis-
trict court of the United States.
But what was the principle upon which that case turned? and
what resemblance has it to the questions we are now called on to
consider ?
Here were two courts of common law, exercising the same juris-
diction, within the same territorial limits, and both courts governed
by the same laws. Neither court had any peculiar or exclusive
jurisdiction over the property in question, nor of any peculiar right
or lien upon it. The State court had the same power with the Dis-
trict Court to hear and decide any question that might arise as to
the rights of property of any person, and to protect any liens and
priorities of payment to which the property or its proceeds were
liable. In a word, they were courts of concurrent and co-ordinate
jurisdiction over the subject matter; and if the plaintiff in the Dis-
trict Court had any preferred interest in the property, or any supe-
rior or prior claim, he could have asserted that claim in the State
court, and have obtained there the same remedy and the same pro-
tection of his rights, and as effectually and speedily as the court of
the United States could have afforded him.
And this court, in deciding the case, did nothing more than
adhere to a rule which, I believe, is universally recognized by
courts of justice-that is, that between courts of concurrent juris-
diction, the court that first obtains possession of the controversy,
or of the property in dispute, mustbe allowed to dispose of it finally,
without interference or interruption from the co-ordinate court.
And this rule applies whiere the concurrent jurisdictions are two
courts of the United States or two courts of a State, or one of them
the court of a State and the other a court of the United States. It
was no new question when the case of Hagan vs. Lucas came before
this court; but an old and familiar one, upon which courts of con-
current jurisdiction have necessarily uniformly acted, in order to
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prevent indecorous and injurious conflicts between courts in the
administration of justice. Indeed, this principle seems hardly to
have been disputed in that case. The arguments of counsel are not
given in the report. But, judging from the opinion delivered by
the court, the main question seems to have been, whetheF the slaves
were not released from execution by the bond given by Lucas, and
the bond substituted in their place. The court, under the authority
of a case decided in the State court of Alabama, held that they were
not released from the sheriff's levy, and therefore applied the fami-
liar rule in relation to courts of concurrent jurisdiction.
But how can the case of Hfagan vs. Lucas, influence the decision
of this ? If Pennsylvania had an admiralty or any other court
with jurisdiction over maritime liens, and the attaching creditor had
proceeded in that conrt, undoubtedly the same principle would
apply. But the State has no such court, and can have none such,
under the constitution of the United States. The jurisdiction of
the District Court is exclusive on that subject, and the line of divi-
sion between that and the courts of common law is plainly and dis-
tinctly drawn. And when the District Court proceeded to enforce
the lien for seamen's wages, it interfered with no right which the
creditor had acquired under the process of attachment, nor with any
right of property, subject to State jurisdiction; and when the Dis-
trict Court, acting within its exclusive and appropriate jurisdiction,
proceeded to enforce the preferred and superior right of seamen's
wages, it claimed no superiority over the State court; it merely
exercised a separate and distinct jurisdiction. It displaced no right
which the attaching creditor had acquired under the State process,
nor in any degree lessened his security. Nor did it interfere with
any right over which the State court had jurisdiction. If the liens
were paid without sale, his attachment still held the ship. If she
was sold, his right, whatever it was, adhered to the surplus, if any
remained after discharging the liens. And if the State court passed
judgment of condemnation in his favor, he would be entitled to
receive from the registry of the admiralty whatever was awarded
him by the State court, if there was surplus enough after paying
the superior and preferred claims for maritime liens. I can see no
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conflict of jurisdiction ; nor can there be any, if each tribunal con-
fines itself to its constitutional and appropriate jurisdiction. "
But my brethren of the majority seem to suppose, that the prin-
ciple decided in Eagan vs. Lucas goes farther than I understand
it; and that it has established the principle, that where a ship,
within the limits of a State, is attached by an officer of a State,
under process from a State court, no process can be served upon it
from a district court of the United States, while it is held under
attachment by the sheriff; and that the sheriff might lawfully repel
the marshal if he attempted to serve a process in rem, although it
was issued by the District Court of the United States, to enforce a
paramount and a superior claim, for -which the ship was liable, and
which the District Court had the exclusive right to enforce, and over
which the State court had not jurisdiction.
If this be the principle adopted by this court, and be followed out
to its necessary and legitimate results, it must lead them further, I
am convinced, than they are prepared to go. For it might have
happened, that after this vessel was seized by the sheriff, and while
she remained in his possession, it was discovered that she was liable
to forfeiture, or had incurred some pecuniary penalty, which was
by law a lien upon her, and process issued by the District Court to
arrest her, in order to enforce the penalty or forfeiture. In such
a case no one, I presume, would think that the sheriff had a right
to keep out the marshal, and prevent him from arresting the ship;
nor would such an arrest, I presume, be regarded as a violation of
the sovereignty of the State, nor an illegal interference with the
process or jurisdiction of its courts. Yet if it be admitted that the
marshal may, under such process, lawfully take possession and con-
trol of the vessel, upon what principle of law does it stand? Simply
upon this, that the rights of the United States, under the constitu-
tion, are paramount, and superior to the right of the attaching
creditor. And as the District Court has exclusive jurisdiction to
decide upon them, and enforce them, and the State court no
jurisdiction over them, the State court cannot lawfully interfere with
the process of the District Court, when exercising its exclusive
jurisdiction to enforce and maintain this paramount and superior
right.
TAYLOR'S ADMINISTRATORS vs. CARRYL.
But is not the claim for mariners' wages superior and paramount
to the claim of the general creditor at whose suit the attachment
issued ? Has not the District Court the exclusive power to enforce
and maintain this right, and is not the State court without jurisdic-
tion upon the subject ? It is true, that the seaman's right is not
regarded as of equal dignity and importance with the rights of the
United States. But if the proposition be true, that after the vessel
was seized by the sheriff she was in the custody of the law of the
State, and no process from the District Court would authorize the
marshal to arrest her, although it was issued upon a higher and
superior right for which the ship was liable, and over which the State
court had no jurisdiction, the proposition must necessarily embrace
process to enforce the superior and prior rights of the United States,
as well as the superior and privileged rights of individuals; for the
District Court has no right to trespass upon the sovereign and reserved
rights of a State, or to interfere unlawfully with the process of its
courts, because the United States are the libellants, and the process
issued at their instance. In this respect the United States have no
greater right than an individual. And if the Royal Saxon might
have been arrested by the marshal to enforce the higher and superior
right of the United States in the appropriate court, I can see no
reason why he might not, upon the same grounds, make the arrest
to enforce and protect the higher and superior right to mariners'
wages. I think it will be difficult to draw any clear line of distinc-
tion between them, and, in my opinion, the process may be lawfully
executed by the marshal in either case.
I agree with the majority of my brethren in regarding it as among
the first duties of every court of the United States carefully to avoid
trespassing upon the rights reserved to the States, or interfering
with the process of their courts when they are exercising either their
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction in the matter in controversy.
And with the high trusts and powers confided by the Constitution
to the Supreme Court, it is more especially its duty to abstain from
all such interference itself, and to revise carefully the judgments of
the inferior courts of the United States whenever that question
arises, and to reverse them if they exceed their jurisdiction. But I
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must add, that while in my judgment this court should be the last
court in the Union to exercise powers not authorized by the consti-
tution, it should be the last court in the Union to retreat from duties
which the constitution and laws have imposed.
It has been suggested that this was a foreign ship, and the sea-
men foreign seamen, and that they are not therefore embraced in
the act of Congress which gives a lien upon the vessel for seamen's
wages. But this provision of the law was nothing more than an
affirmance of the lien which was given by the maritime law in
England from the earliest period of its commercial jurisprudence,
and indeed by the maritime law of every nation engaged in com-
mercial adventures. And the English law was brought with them by
the colonists when they migrated to this country, and was invariably
acted on by every admiralty court, long before the act of Congress
was passed.
It is true that it is not in every case obligatory upon our courts
of admiralty to enforce it in the case of foreign ships, and the right
or duty of doing so is sometimes regulated with particular nations
by treaty. But as a general rule, where there is no treaty regula-
tion, and no law of Congress to the contrary, the admiralty courts
have always enforced the lien where it was given by the law of the
State or nation to which the vessel belonged. In this respect the
admiralty courts act as international courts, and enforce the lien
upon principles of comity. There may be, and sometimes have
been, cases in which the court, under special circumstances, has re-
fused to interfere between the foreign seamen and ship owner; but
that is always a question of sound judicial discretion, and does not
affect the jurisdiction of the court, and, like all questions resting in
the judicial discretion of the court below, (such as granting or re-
fusing a new trial, continuing a case, or quashing an execution,)
it is not a subject for revision here, and furnishes no ground for
appeal, or for impeaching the validity of the judgment. The Dis-
trict Court undoubtedly had jurisdiction of the cdse, if in its discre-
tion it deemed it proper to exercise it.
Indeed, there appears to have been no special circumstances
brought to the notice of the court to induce it, upon international
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considerations, not to interfere. There was no objection on the
part of the foreign ship owner or master, but, on the contrary, a
general desire that the court should do so. And certainly this cir-
cumstance was not even adverted to in the State or District Court,
and had no influence upon the opinions of either.
.It is perhaps to be regretted that this question of jurisdiction did
not arise between two courts of common law, but has arisen between
the admiralty courts of the United States and a common law court
of the State. I am sensible that among the highest and most en-
lightened minds which have been nurtured and trained in the
studies of the common law, there is a jealousy of the admiralty
jurisdiction, and that the principles of the common law are regarded
as favorable to personal liberty and personal rights, and those of
the admiralty as tending in a contrary direction. And under the
influence of this opinion, they are apt to consider any restriction
upon the power of the latter as so much gained to the cause of free
institutions. And as there is no admiralty jurisdiction reserved to
the States, and the administration of justice in their courts is con-
fined to questions of common law and chancery, the studies and pur-
suits of the jurists in the States do not generally lead them to examine
into the history and character of the admiralty jurisdiction, nor to
inquire into its usefulness, and indeed necessity, in every country
extensively engaged in commerce. Their opinions are naturally
formed from common law decisions, and common law writings and
commentaries. And no one has contributed more than Lord Coke
to create these opinions. His great knowledge of the common law
displayed in his voluminous writings, has made him a high au-
thority in all matters concerning the administration of justice. And
every one who in early life has passed through the usual studies of
the common law, feels the influence of his opinions afterwards, in
all matters connected with legal inquiries. The firmness with
-which he resisted the encroachments of the crown upon the liberty
of the subject in the rdigns of James I. and Charles I., has added
to the weight of his opinions, and impressed them more strongly
and durably upon the mind of the student. But before we receive
implicitly his doctrines on the admiralty jurisdiction, it may be
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well to remember that in the case of Smart vs. Wolf, 3 T. R. 348,
where the opinions of Lord Coke were referred to upon a question
of admiralty jurisdiction, Mr. Justice Buller said, "with respect to
what is said relative to the admiralty jurisdiction in 4 Inst., 135,
that part of Lord Coke's work has been always received with great
caution, and frequently contradicted. He seems to have enter-
tained not only a jealousy of, but an enmity against the jurisdic-
tion."
I need not speak of the weight to which this opinion is entitled,
when judicially pronounced by Mr. Justice Buller in the King's
Bench, in deciding a well considered case then before the court.
Every one who has studied the history of English jurisprudence
generally, and who has not confined his researches to the decisions
of the common law courts and the commentaries of writers trained
in them, is aware that a very grave contest existed for a long time,
as to the relative jurisdictions of the court of King's Bench and the
admiralty after the passage of the statutes of Richard II, which are
so often referred to. And this controversy was continued with
unabated zeal on both sides after the passage of the statutes of
Henry IV, and Henry VIII, on the same subject.
It is not my purpose to discuss the points' on which the courts
differed. I refer to the controversy merely to show that the con-
struction given to the English statutes by the King's Bench, and
which finally narrowed so much the jurisdiction of the English ad-
miralty, was earnestly disputed at the time by many of the most
distinguished jurists of the day. Indeed, the decisions of the King's
Bench were by no means uniform, and the opinions of common law
judges on the subject widely differed. This appears by the opin-
ion of the twelve judges, given to the king in council, according
to the usage of the English government at that period of its his-
tory, and also by the ordinance of the Parliament in 1648, both of
which materially differed from the decisions made before and after-
wards in the King's Bench. I refer to these opinions particularly
because they show, past doubt, that the construction placed upon
the English statutes, now so confidently assumed to have been the
admitted one at the time, was, in fact, for several generations,
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earnestly disputed by legal minds of the highest order, and was at
length forced on the admiralty by the controlling power of the
King's Bench; for, whatever justice or weight of argument there
might be on the part of the construction of the admiralty judges,
the power was in the King's Bench. It exercised not merely the
ordinary appellate authority of a superior court, but it issued its
prohibition, forbidding any other court to try a suit brought in it
where the judges of the King's Bench denied the jurisdiction of the
inferior court, and claimed the right to have the case tried before
themselves.
How, and under what influences, such a power would be exercised
from the reign of Richard II to that of Henry VIII, we may readily
imagine. It was a period when England was divided by the
rival claims of the houses of York and Lancaster to the crown, and
was often convulsed by civil wars, not upon questions of civil liberty
or national policy, but merely to determine which of the claimants
should be their king; and when the monarch who succeeded in
fighting his way to the throne framed his policy, and appointed
the officers, civil as well as military, with a view to maintain his
own power, and destroy the hopes of his adversary, rather than
with any desire to promote the liberties of the people, or establish
an enlightened and impartial administration of justice in his courts.
And as the king was presumed to preside in person in the King's
Bench, and the judges held their offices at his pleasure, no reader
of history will doubt the temper and spirit in which power was
exercised.
But we are not left to conjecture on that subject. The same
efforts and means that were successfully used to break down the
court of admiralty, were also used at the same time, and by the
same men, to restrict the powers of the court of chancery, but not
with the like success. And the same reasons were assigned for it-
that is, that it proceeded upon the principles and adopted the
practice of the civil law, and had no jury, and was on that
account unfavorable to the principles of civil liberty, whilst the
proceedings at common law supported and cherished them. These
hostile efforts against the chancery continued until the reign of
James I, and were made with renewed vigor in the time of Lord
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Ellesmere, who was appointed lord keeper by Queen Elizabeth,
and chancellor by lames I.
A brief passage from the life of Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, by
Lord Campbell, will tell us how far the earlier decisions of the
courts of King's Bench on the statutes of Richard II, Henry IV,
and Henry VHI, which are so often pressed upon us, ought to be
respected as just interpretations of these statutes, and also how far
we ought to regard those judges as high and impartial jurists, seek-
ing only to maintain free institutions when they give judgments re-
straining the jurisdiction of other courts.
The passage I quote from Lord Campbell is in his 2d. vol. Lives
of the Chancellors, 184, 185 (London edition of 1845,) where, after
stating that few of his (Lord Ellesmere's) judgments had come down
in a shape to enable us to form an opinion of their merits, but that
they were said to have been distinguished for sound learning, lucid
arrangement and great precision of doctrine, he proceeds in the
following words:
"The only persons by whom he was not entirely approved were
the common law judges. He had the boldness to question and cor-
rect their pedantic rules more freely than Lord Keeper Puckering,
Lord Keeper Bacon, or any of his predecessors, had done, and not
unfrequently he granted injunctions against executions on common
law judgments, on the ground of fraud in the plaintiff, or some
defect of procedure by which justice had been defeated. He thus
not only hurt the pride of these venerable magistrates, but he
interfered with their profits, which depended mainly upon the num-
ber of suits brought before them, and the reputation of their respec-
tive courts. These jealousies which begun so soon after his
appointment, went on constantly increasing, till at last, as we shall
see, they produced an explosion which shook Westminster Hall to
its centre."
We need nothing further to show what respect is due to the opin-
ions of judges actuated by such motives.
The legislation of England, however, in the present age, when
the principles of civil liberty and enlightened jurisprudence are
better understood, shows that the restrictions upon the admiralty
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jurisdiction, imposed by the King's Bench, have been found unsuit-
able to the wants of a great commercialpeople, and that the enlarge-
ment of that jurisdiction is not regarded, at the present day, as
adverse to the march of liberal and free institutions. And the
decisions of the King's Bench having been too firmly established,
by repeated adjudications, to be removed by judicial authority, Par-
liament interposed, and by the statute of third and fourth Victoria,
passed in 1840, restored to the court many of the most important
powers in civil cases that had been wrested from it by the decisions
in the King's Bench. The courts of common law proved to be far
less suited for such controversies. And it is no small evidence of
the soundness of the doctrines heretofore upheld by this court, that
with the powers restored by Parliament, the English admiralty now
exercises nearly the same jurisdiction which this court had pre-
viously maintained to be the appropriate and legitimate power of
a court of admiralty. A synopsis of the jurisdiction of the Eng-
lish admiralty, as now established, is stated in 1 Kent's Com.,
871,'872, in the notes. But it is proper to remark, that in
stating in these notes the admiralty jurisdiction as recognized in
the United States, I think it is stated too broadly-broader than
this court has sanctioned; for, as regards the jurisdiction in policies
of insurance, I believe it has never been asserted in any circuit
but the first, and certainly has never been brought here for adjudi-
cation.
This brief review of the long contest in England, between the
courts of King's Bench and the admiralty, seemed to be necessary,
as it shows past doubt that the efforts of the former to take away
the jurisdiction of the latter, and to compel the suitors to seek
redress in the King's Bench, did not arise from any anxiety to pre-
serve free institutions, and that the charges made against the
admiralty of favoring despotic principles, and usurping powers
which did not belong to it, are without foundation. It shows, more-
over, that the persevering encroachments of the King's Bench, and
its unwarranted construction of the English statutes, were con-
stantly disputed and opposed by enlightened jurists. The contest
was carried on to a very late period, with varying decisions in the
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court of King's Bench itself, upon the subject, and no certain and
definite line of jurisdiction, in admiralty, appears to have been
fixed and established even at the period of the American Revolu-
tion, and indeed not until the passage of the late act of Parlia-
ment.
And if we are to look to England for an example of enlightened
policy in the government, and a system of jurisprudence suited to
the wants of a great commercial nation, or a just and impartial
administration of the laws by judicial tribunals upon principles most
favorable to civil liberty, I should not look to the reigns of Richard
II., or of Henry IV. or Henry VIII., for either. And I should
rather" expect to find examples worthy of respect and commenda-
tion in the England of the present day, in her statute of third and
fourth of Victoria, in the elevated and enlightened character of its
present courts of justice, and in their mutual respect and considera-
tion for the acts and authority of each other, without any display
of jealousy or suspicion.
As to the unfavorable tendencies of the admiralty jurisdiction, it
is, perhaps, sufficient to say, that under the constitution of the
United States it has no criminal jurisdiction; nor is the suitor
without the protection of a trial by jury, if the legislative body
which creates the court and regulates its powers think proper to
give the right. There is nothing in the character and proceedings
of the admiralty incompatible with the trial by jury. And, indeed,
it has already been given to a certain extent by the act of Congress
of 1845, and may at the will of Congress be given in every case,
if it is supposed the purposes of justice require it.
I can, therefore, see no ground for jealousy or enmity to the
admiralty jurisdiction. It has -in it no one quality inconsistent with
or unfavorable to free institutions. The simplicity and celerity of
its proceedings make a jurisdiction of that kind a necessity in every
just and enlightened commercial nation. The delays unavoidably
incident to a court of common law, from its rules and modes of
proceeding, are equivalent to a denial of justice where the rights of
seamen, or maritime contracts or torts are concerned; and sea-
faring men, the witnesses to prove them. And the public confidence
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is conclusively proved by the well known fact, that in the great
majority of cases, where there is a choice of jurisdictions, the party
seeks his remedy in the court of admiralty in preference to a court
of common law of the State, however eminent and distinguished the
State tribunals may be.
The opinions of Lord Coke, in all matters relating to the laws
and institutions of England, were deeply impressed upon the Eng-
lish nation, and for a long time exercised a controlling influence.
But with the advance of knowledge, and a more enlightened judg-
ment in the science of government and jurisprudence, the courts of
justice have not shut their eyes to errors committed under the influ-
ence of prejudice and passion. This is evident from the language
of Mr. Justice Buller, herein before mentioned, by the respect shown
to the jurisdiction and authority of the admiralty in the case of the
Plora, in 1st Hag., and by the recent act of Parliament, and I can
see no good reason for fostering in the common law courts of this
country, whether State or federal, opinions springing from preju-
dices, which arose out of the conflicts of the times, and which tend
to create jealousies and suspicions on their part, and produce dis-
cord instead of harmony and mutual good feeling in the tribunals
of justice. These jealousies and suspicions of Lord Coke undoubt-
edly grew out of the vehement conflicts, personal as well as politi-
cal, in which he was so prominently engaged during all his lifetime.
They have been discarded and disowned in the courts of the coun-
try from which we derived them, and also emphatically repudiated
by the statute of third and fourth of Victoria.
And believing as I do, upon the best consideration I am able to
give to the subject, that the decision and the principle upon which
the opinion of the court founds itself is inapplicable to the case
before us, and that if it is carried out to its legitimate results it will
deprive the admiralty of power, useful, and indeed necessary, for
the purposes of justice, and conferred on it by the constitution and
laws of the United States, I most respectfully record my dissent.
Mr. Justice WAYNE, Mr. Justice GRIER, and Mr. Justice CLIF-
FOlD also dissent, and concur fully in the preceding views expressed
by the Chief Justice.
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JOHN MURDOOK, APPELLANT vs. BROWN BROTHERS & CO., APPELLEES.
1
1. The legislature, in 1833, chartered the Grand Gulf Railroad and Banking Com-
pany, with power "to purchase and possess personal estate of any kind what-
ever," and tto sell and dispose of the same at pleasure;" in 1840, the legisla-
ture enacted that, it should not be lawful for any bank in.the.State to transfer by
endorsement, any note, &c., and in an action on such note, the fact of transfer
might be pleaded in abatement: He d, that the act of 1840 was constitutional,
and applied to the Grand Gulf.Banking Company, inasmuch as the power of
transfer was neither expressly granted nor required by implication.
2. Judcial interpretation of the words "personal estate."
3. Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 301; commented on and applied.
4. Grand Gulf Bank v. The State, 10 S. & M., commented on and distinguished.
Appeal from the District Chancery Court at Natchez.
This cause was elaborately argued, on briefs by
Messrs. Winchester and Eustis, for the appellees, and
Messrs. H. T. -Ellett and TV. S. Wilson, for appellant.
The.facts, sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court, which
was delivered by
RANDY, J.-The case presented by.the-record before us, is.this:
On the 18th Noveniber, 1841, the plaintiffs in -error executed their
promissory note to'the President and Directors of. the Grand Gulf
Railroad and Banking Company, a bank of this State, incorporated
by the legislature in the year 1833, by whom the note. was. assigned
by deed of assignment on the 31st December, 1842, to the..defend-
ants in error, .who'brought this suit to recover the amount of it.
The plaintiffs in error pleaded in abatement to .the suit, that the
note was assigned by the bank in" violation of the' statute of the
State, passed on the 21st February, 1840, which, enacts: that "it
shall not be lawful for any bank in this State, to transfer, by en-
dorsement or otherwise,'any note, bill receivable, or other evidence
I We are indebted to Geo. I. Swann, Esq., of Jackson Miss., for this case, much
in advance of the regular State reports. We are informed that Mr. Swan pur-
poses to print the more important cases in a periodical shape, as soon as they are
delivered by the court. This will be of much value both within and without the
State. We think the Bench and the Bar of Mississippi fortunate in having the
abilities of both Mr. Swann and Mr. George enlisted in their behalf.-E. A. L. .
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of debt; and if it shall appear in evidence, upon the trial of any
action upon any such note, bill receivable, or other evidence of
debt, that the same was transferred, the same shall abate on the
plea of the defendant."
The title of the defendants in error to the note is based upon the
assignment to them: and the question is thus presented, whether
the defendants in error acquired by the assignment such a title as
would enable them to maintain an action thereupon in their own
names.
On the one hand, it is insisted that the assignment was in viola-
tion of the statute of 1840, and is illegal and void, and that no
right of action passed by it. On the other hand, it is contended
that that act was a violation of the right vested in the bank by its
charter, to transfer and dispose of its property, including promis-
sory notes, and that the statute, being an impairing of the contract
between the State and the bank under the charter, was unconstitu-
tional and void. It is admitted that the statute of 1840 is consti-
tutional and valid, except so far as it impairs the right granted to
the bank by its charter to transfer its evidences of debt.
It is to be observed that the note in question was made and de-
livered to the bank after the passage of the act of 1840, and hence
no question arises as to the unconstitutionality of that act, on the
ground that it impaired the right of assignment existing by the
general law, at the time of the execution of the note, and which
entered into and became an incident to the contract.
The case, therefore, turns upon the single question, whether, by
the terms of the charter, the right to assign promissory notes is
among the powers granted to the bank; and this involves two
points for consideration. 1st. Whether the power is expressll
granted in the charter ; and, 2d. Whether it is necessary to the
exercise of any of the powers expressly granted, and therefore
arises by implication.
1. The power is claimed as expressly granted by the second
section of the charter, which provides that the corporation "shall
be capable in law of purchasing and possessing lands, tenements.
.. nd hereditaments, and personal estate of any kind whatever, to an-
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amount not exceeding the sum of one million of dollars, besides
the cost of constructing the railroad and appurtenances thereto,
hereinafter mentioned, and the same may sell and dispose of at
pleasure." It is said that the power thus granted " to purchase
and possess personal estate of any kind whatever," and "to sell
and dispose of the same at pleasure," gives the power to assign
promissory notes, which are recognized as a part of its property,
and it is not pretended that any other part of the charter gives
any sanction to the idea that this power was expressly conferred.
The argument in favor of the power rests upon the force of the
words "personal estate," above quoted, and it is said that these
words comprehend promissory notes.
Conceding that these words are sufficiently comprehensive in the
abstract, to embrace promissory notes, yet the particular inquiry is,
not what is the abstract force of the words, or what they may com-
prehend, but in what sense were they intended to be used as they
are found in the charter. The sense in which they were intended
to be used, furnishes the rule of interpretation, and this is to be
collected from the context, and a narrower or more extended meaning
is to be given according as the intention is thus indicated. Michell
vs. Michell, 5 Madd. 72 ; Hotham vs. Sutton, 15 Yes. 820 ; Stuart
vs. Barl of Bute, 3 Ves. 212. And the rule is, that the words
" estate" or "' effects," and the like, if used in a clause containing
an enumeration of personal estate, will generally be confined to
estate or effects, ejusdem generis with those specified, as being the
most natural, when unexplained by the context. .Rawlings vs.
Jennings, 13 Ves. 46 ; Stuart vs. Bute, 320 ; ifotharm vs. Sutton,
supra.
We must look, then, to the connection in which the words are
found, in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind in
enacting the provisions of the second section, and graduate the
general words used accordingly.
The section first prescribes upon what conditions the corporation
shall go into operation-fixes its name and the term of its existence
-and then follows the provision above quoted, authorizing it "by
that name to purchase and possess lands, tenements and heredita-
ments, and personal estate of any kind whatever," * * * "and to
MURDOCK vs. BROWN BROTHERS & CO.
sell and dispose of the same." This is done before any provision
is made touching the particular purpose for which the corporation
was created, viz: to construct a railroad, and to carry on the busi-
ness of banking, discount' promissory notes, deal in exchange, &c.;
and it appears to be wholly independent of the business which was
the especial object of the charter so far as it had respect to promis-
sory notes and evidences of debt. That most material part of the
incorporation is afterwards regulated by several sections defining
its duties and powers in that respect. By the well settled rule of
construction, therefore, it is plain that these general words in the
second section have no reference to the especial business for which
the company was chartered. What, then, was the legislative intent
in authorizing the acquisition and disposition of " lands, tenements
and hereditaments and personal estate ?" It was manifestly to
make provision for the purchase and sale of such property, whether
real or personal, of a specific nature, as might become necessary in
constructing the railroad and in carrying on the business of banking
in its usual course-to make provision for something not forming a
part of the very business intended to be carried on, and which was,
in subsequent parts of the charter, the subject of special attention
and regulations. It is evident that the legislature had not the subject
of the purchase or assignment of cthoses in action in view, in this
section, from various considerations.
It is a question of at least much doubt, whether the words "per-
sonal estate of any kind whatever," taken alone, would embrace
promissory notes; and the contrary opinion would seem to be the
result of the authorities in which the question has been involved.
Poplham vs. Lady Aylesbury, Ambl. 68; Moore vs, Moore, 1 Bro.
C. 0. 127; Pleming vs. Brook, 1 Sch. & Lef. 318; Stuart vs.
Earl of Bute, supra, 2 Wins. Ex'rs, 749, 1st edit. But apart
from this, the words as here used cannot be held to embrace pro-
missory notes, for the following reasons:
1. The context shows that -no such thing was in contemplation
in the section. The reception and disposition of promissory notes
was one of the primary objects of the charter, and they are the
subjects of special regulation in other and appropriate parts of it.
These sections are the proper places for provisions in relation to the
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use and benefit to be derived to the corporation from the reception
and disposition of promissory notes, which were there the subject
of consideration, if any such special provisions had been intended
to be made. But this section has relation to another and a distinct
matter, and promissory notes are not ejusdem generis with the sub-
ject matter treated of in it. It is one of the best settled rules of
construction, that words in different parts of a statute must be re-
ferred to their appropriate connection; giving to each in its place
its proper force-reddendo singula singulis-and if possible render-
ing none of them useless or superfluous. This rule is wholly disre-
garded in the construction contended for; for if the power to
purchase and dispose of personal estate means the power to take
and assign promissory notes, it renders the subsequent provisions
in relation to dealing in exchange and in bank and other stocks
useless.
2. The words employed negative the assumption that promissory
notes were in contemplation. The language is-"purchase and
possess lands, tenements and hereditaments, and personal estate of
any kind whatever." The word "possess" is appropriate to specific
property, but not to choses in action; and while all the language
used is appropriate to the purchase, possession and sale of specific
property, none of it has any necessary or clear application to choses
in action. It is in the last degree improbable that, if the legislature
had intended in this section to grant the power to transfer evidences
of debt, language would not have been used clearly and directly
applicable to so important a subject in the business of the corpora-
tion. It would not have been left to doubtful and inappropriate
language.
3. If the construction contended for be correct, the power granted
is altogether indefinite. The mode of its exercise is in no wise pro-
vided for or indicated-and the important question arises, how is it
to be exercised ? Shall the transfer be by deed, or by assignment
in writing on the paper, or by a separate instrument-by endorse-
ment, or by mere delivery? Does the legal title, or a mere equit-
able interest pass to the transferree? Is the power confined to
written evidences of debt, and does it not extend to open accounts,
which are as much personal estate as promissory notes ? All these
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important matters are wholly without regulation in the charter;
and if there was no other statute regulating them, it might be
asserted as beyond all question, that the charter does not authorize
or prescribe an assignment in any particular mode, nor ascertain
the auture of the title which should pass by the transfer; nor could
* any court having.respect for established principles of law, determine
what mode of assignment was intended, or what kind of title passed,
or what kind of pfoperty should be transferred. It cannot be sup-
posed that if the 'power of assignment had been intended to be
granted, it would have been left to depend upon language so vague
as to render its exercise doubtful and impracticable.
4. The provision is wholly unnecessary and superfluous as to
promissory notes. The right to take such paper, was the very
foundation upon which the franchises were granted, which therefore
required no distinct and express grant of power in order to its
exercise. It is merely recognized in the subsequent sections. And
the right to transfer such paper also existed by the general law of
the land, which was applicable to all corporations entitled to take
promissory notes as well as to private individuals. Comm'l Bank
vs. Nolan, 7 How. 508. And this right was universally understood
and recognized. Thus, when the right of the corporation to assign
notes existed by the general law, it is not to be supposed that the
legislature would perform the idle act of re-enacting that power in
this charter; and if that had been deemed necessary, that it would
have been granted in terms so indefinite as to render the right
useless.
For these reasons we think that the conclusion is not to be avoided
that the right to assign promissory notes is not expressly granted in
the charter.
II. Is the right, then, necessary to the exercise of any of the
powers expressly granted, and therefore to be considered as part of
the contract?
The doctrine is too well settled in this country to admit of con-
troversy at this day that a corporation, created by statute, "1 pos-
sesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers
upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence," Dart-
mouth College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 636, and that it derives all its
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powers from that act, and is capable of exerting its faculties only in the
manner which that act authorizes, Head & Amory vs. Providence
Ins. 0o., .2 Cranch, 127. In order to derive the power to assign
promissory notes by implication, it must be shown that it would be
necessary to the enjoyment of some specially granted right, so that
without it that right would fail. But no such case is presented in
this charter.
The special powers of the corporation, in addition to that already
considered, appear to be-lst. A grant of " all the rights, privileges,
and powers that may be necessary to enable them to construct, con-.
tinue agd keep in repair, the railroad."-Section 4. 2d. A recogni-
tion of the right to make loans upon promissory notes.-Section
18. 3d. A grant of power "to deal in exchange and in bank and
other public stocks, and to issue notes, signed by the President and
countersigned by the Cashier, &c., which shall be obligatory on the
company," &c.-Section 15. All these powers could be exercised,
and the right granted be enjoyed, without the assignment of its
promissory notes. The right to make contracts for the construction
of the road, as well as the right to deal in exchange and public
stocks, might be fully exercised without the assignment of its debts;
and the use and bcnefit of its promissory notes, taken for loans or
otherwise, might be fully realized without their assignment. It was
no more necessary that the right of assignment should arise from
the power to take notes in the case of this bank than in the case of
a promissory note taken by an individual; for the individual would
have as perfect a right of private property in his promissory note,
with its incidents, as the corporation could derive from the mere
fact of being authorized to take such a note. No right granted in
the charter fails by reason of. the incapacity of the corporation to
assign its promissory notes, and, therefore, the right of assign-
ment cannot be claimed as granted by implication in the charter.
We are, therefore of opinion that no right was secured to the bank
by the charter, either expressly or by implication, to assign its
promissory notes, and consequently that-no right or privilege in that
respect was violated by the statute of 1840.
But it is urged that that statute has been declared unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the
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Planters' Bank vs. Sharp et al., 6 How. 801, and that that deci-
sion is conclusive of the judgment in this case. That decision has
been yielded to by this court in the cases in which it was made, and
might be considered as conclusive of the question of the constitu-
tionality of the statute in question, as it affected the charters of the
particular banks there brought under consideration. But it only
declares the statute unconstitutional as to those charters, and we
cannot admit its obligatory force as applicable to the present case,
.nd will briefly state the reasons why we do not consider it conclu-
sive of this case.
In the first place, it is only the principle declared in that case
that can be considered as applicable to the charter presented for
our construction in this case; and we do not recognize the right of
any other judicial tribunal either to expound the statutes of this
State, and to determine their legal construction or effect, or to pre-
scribe rules by which we are to be bound in their construction, with
the single exception of a statute alleged to be in conflict with the
Constitution of the United States. The Supreme Court of the
United States is authorized by the 25th section of the judiciary act
of 1789 to decide the question of the "validity of the statute of
any State on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution
of the United States," and of course the judgment of that court
pronouncing a State statute unconstitutional, as impairing the obli-
gation of a particular contract, will be conclusive upon the State
court upon the sole question of the effect and character of the statute
presented for consideration. But we deny the power of that court
to expound another statute not alleged to be unconstitutional, and
to fix its construction and legal effect, in opposition to the adjudi-
cation of the State court having jurisdiction of the question, because
a particular construction may be attempted to be given to the origi-
nal statute by the party complaining, and in order to render the
second statute unconstitutional.
Whenever a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional on the ground
that it violates rights granted by a previous statute, the first ques-
tion which arises is, what is the force and effect of the original
.statute, what are the rights secured by the contract ? The solution
of that question belongs to the proper judicial tribunals of the State
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by which the statute was enacted, and no principle of law is of more
universal acceptation, or stands upon sounder reasons, than that the
construction put by the proper courts upon the statutes of their own
jurisdiction, is conclusive of their force and effect, and will be so re-
garded by all foreign judicatures when they may become the subject
of consideration. Story's Confi. Laws, sec. 272, sec. 277. "This
course," says Chief Justice Marshall, "is founded on the principle,
supposed to be universally recognized, that the judicial department
of every government, when such department exists, is the appro-
priate organ for construing the legislative acts of that government.
Thus no court in the universe, which professed to be governed by
principle, would, we presume, undertake to say that the courts of
any other nation had misunderstood their own statutes, and there-
fore erect itself into a tribunal which should correct such misunder-
standing. We receive the construction given by the courts of the
nation as the true sense of the law, and feel ourselves no more at
liberty to depart from that construction than to depart from the
words of the statute. -Elmendorf vs. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152. This
proceeds upon the reason that the courts of a country are presumed
to have a more intimate knowledge of the reason and objects of its
statutes than any foreign tribunal, and consequently to be more
competent to give a just exposition of them with reference to the
purposes for which they were passed. Accordingly, it is said by
the Supreme Court of the United States, in the Commercial Banc
vs. Buckingham, 5 How. 343: 11 It is the peculiar province and
privilege of the State courts to construe their own statutes, and it
is no part of the functions of this court to review their decisions or
assume jurisdiction over them on the pretence that their judgments
have impaired the obligations of contracts." This rule has been
often recognized and acted upon by that court, insomuch that they
have abandoned their own decisions made in accordance with the
rule as settled by the State courts, and confined themselves to a new
and different rule established by subsequent decisions of those courts.
ls this rule altered by the 25th section of the judiciary act, which
gives jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to revise a judgment of a
State court, declaring that a State statute does not impair the obli,
gation of a contract arising upon a previous statute ? We think not.
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The question for the Supreme Court, in such a case, is, whether
the second statute is unconstitutional, and its power is confined to
determining the force and effect of that statute. That court has
authority to declare whether that statute impairs the rights secured
by the previous statute or contract. But how are these rights to be
ascertained and determined ? No question of the constitutionality
of the first statute is presented, but the question as to that simply
is, what is its force and effect, and what was granted by it ? The
right to determine that, stands upon the general principle applica-
ble to the construction of statutes above stated, and must belong to
the State court. If this were not true, any matter of State policy
depending upon its statutes and the expositions of its courts, would
be subject to revision by the Supreme Court, whenever any statute
subsequently passed might be alleged to affect rights acquired or
claimed under previous statutes or contracts; and, under color of
the power to pronounce the statute complained of unconstitutional,
that court might proceed to reverse all the decisions of the State
courts determining the force and effect of the contract, whether
founded on a statute or general rules of law, alleged to be violated
by the obnoxious statute, and thus subvert the entire policy of the
State upon the subject matter of the controversy. And it would
follow that the construction of all contracts made under State laws,
would be brought within the overruling power of the federal govern-
ment, whenever a State might think fit to pass any statute in rela-
tion to such contracts. The fallacy and danger of such a doctrine
appears to be obvious.
Suppose that there had been no general statute in this State,
authorizing the assignment of promissory notes ; and that this Bank
had transferred a note, claiming the right to do so under the pro-
visions of its charter, and that a question of title in the assignee
had arisen, and this court had decided that it had no power by the
charter to make the assignment, there can be no doubt but that that
decision would have been conclusive of the right of assignment, and
that no court could have disregarded it without a violation of estab-
lished doctrine. But suppose, in addition to this, that afterwards
the legislature, in order to prevent the practice of unauthorized
assignments by banks, passed a statute prohibiting such assign-
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ments, or repealing the general law authorizing assignments of
evidences of debt; and that, notwithstanding this, a suit had been
brought by an assignee of such paper, and that the judgment of
this court thereupon had been that the assignment passed no title,
could that court, in such a case, reverse the settled law of this State,
as held in the case first supposed? We say decidedly not. If
this was a case of an ordinary contract between two individuals,
the force and effect of which had been settled by our courts, it could
scarcely be pretended, that upon any question arising upon the
validity of a statute subsequently passed affecting that contract, the
Supreme Court would be authorized to reverse the construction of
the contract settled by this court, and to give it a different force
and effect; and the case is equally strong against the power, with
regard to the established construction of our own statutes-so that
no aid is derived to the argument in favor of the power in the
Supreme Court, from the fact that the charter of the bank is a
contract. For whether contract or statute, or both, it is equally
subject to the lez loci contractus, which this court has the power
absolutely to determine. But if the power of revision exists in the
Supreme Court of the United States, it gives to that court authority
to reverse the settled law of this State, as declared by its constituted
tribunal, in relation to the rights vested under its own laws, when-
ever that court can take jurisdiction by means of another statute
which may be passed touching the subject; and the constitutionality
of which may be questioned, when that court would have no power
to reverse the decision, as directly made, which settled the construc-
tion of the original statute-thus enabling that court to do indi-
rectly what it has no power to do directly-to reverse the settled
law of this State in relation to. our own statutes, by extending the
power given by the judiciary act to determine the validity of a par-
ticular statute alleged to be unconstitutional, so as to authorize that
court to give a construction to another statute or contract in oppo-
sition to the decisions of our own courts. And the power is thus
denied to this court, to determine the rights which pass to a corpo-
ration by a charter granted by our own legislature, and affecting our
own people. It may be safely asserted, that no such dangerous
and anomalous power was ever intended to be conferred upon that
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court by the judiciary act, which was passed by men who so well
understood the rights and powers of the States.
In all cases taken to the Supreme Court, under the judiciary act,
upon the ground that a State statute impairs the obligation of a
contract, the question directly presented for consideration, and
which is the ground of the jurisdiction, is whether that statute is
constitutional or not ? It is true that the question is also involved,
What is the right secured by the contract? But that is not the
ground of the jurisdiction, and is merely incidentally involved.
The nature and extent of the right under the contract, depend upon
the law of the State, and must be determined by its own tribunals,
which furnish the rule of decision upon that point in cases of this
kind, as in all other cases depending upon the construction of the
law of any State. That is a distinct question from the question
whether the right secured is impaired by the statute alleged to
impair it, and is to be determined by reference to the settled law
of the State, and not by the views of the Supreme Court upon the
subject. And any other doctrine would be in opposition to estab-
lished principle, subversive of the rightful authority of the State
tribunals to interpret their own laws, and to determine the effect of
contracts made under them, and productive of conflict between the
rules declared by the Supreme Court and by this court upon a sub-
ject most clearly within our exclusive jurisdiction.
But we do not consider the case relied on, as authority in this
case for other reasons.
The terms of this charter are different from that involved in the
case cited, in several respects.
1. In that case the language of the grant was, that the bank
"shall be capable in law, to have, possess, receive, retain, and
enjoy, &c., lands, &c., goods, chattels, and effects of what kind,
nature, and quality soever, and the same to grant, demise, alien, or
dispose of, &c." It was by force of the words "to receive, retain,
and enjoy effects of whatever kind, and to dispose of the same,"
that the court held the power to assign promissory notes to be
granted. But the language of this charter is much less compre-
hensive. It is merely to purchase and possess, and to sell and dis-
pose of personal estate of any kind whatever. By the context and
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the force of this language, promissory notes cannot be embraced,
as is above shown.
2. No provision is made in this charter, that notes should be
taken, negotiable in their favor-a circumstance in that charter
which appears to have had weight with the court in aid of the posi-
tion, that the power to assign promissory notes was intended to be
conferred.
8. The promissory note in this case, was made after the passage
of the statute of 1840, prohibiting assignments of paper by banks ;
and that, being a general law, not impairing any right specifically
granted in the charter, was valid as a partial repeal of the statute
authorizing the assignment of promissory notes, and binding on
the bank as to all paper taken subsequent to its passage.. Payne
et al. vs. Baldwin et al. 3 S. & M. 661.
These considerations, which appear to have had weight in pro-
ducing the decision in the case of Planters' Bank vs. Sharp et al.,
lead to a different conclusion in the case before us; and upon con-
sideration of that case, we are satisfied that it is not conclusive of
the judgment to be rendered in this case.
It is, however, insisted that the case of Planters' Bank vs.
tSharp et al., has been recognized as binding authority in this court,
with reference to this charter, and must, therefore, be the rule of
decision in this case, and in support of this view, the case of the
Grand Gulf Bank vs. The State, 10 S. & M., is referred to.
It will be seen by reference to that case, that the question of the
power of the bank to assign its evidences of debt, was not pre-
sented for consideration. That question was not made *by the
pleadings, nor argued by counsel. The rights of the assignees of
the bank were not before the court; nor was it necessary for the
decision of the case as presented, that such a question should have
been decided. The question for decision was, whether the judg-
ment of forfeiture against the bank for violation of its charter, was
correct, and the court decided that it was. Whether other parties
had rights by assignment from the bank, or what effects passed
under the judgment of ouster, was not presented for consideration,
and the judgment cannot conclude such rights. Of course, the ob-
servations made in relation to the validity of the assignment made.
